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EASTERN

F.O. 371

1947



PALESTINE

TILE NO. 951

pp. 9370 - 9484

GLOSED UNTIL

1.9.7.8

61881

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1947	PALESTINE	9 OCT
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Reference:-

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En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2830

D. 10.35 p.m. 8th October, 1947

8th October, 1947.

R. 5.00 a.m. 9th October, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem Washington Saving.

IMMEDIATE GLANT

My telegram No. 2810: Palestine Committee.

At eighth meeting on 8th October Winiewicz (Poland) accused His Majesty's Government of pursuing a policy of divide et impera in Palestine and of ruling the country for their own interests in disregard of the welfare of either Arabs or Jews. The Polish Government had the interest of the Arabs at heart, but they could not ignore the rights of the Jewish people as confirmed by many international documents. Winiewicz supported UNSCOP's sixth unanimous recommendation but thought a beginning should be made by the transfer of the 250,000 Jewish displaced persons to Palestine. This would not seriously affect the numerical relationship between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. His preference was for a bi-national state but existing tensions made this impossible at present. He therefore favoured partition on the basis of the majority plan hoping that the economic union for which that plan provided would lead in time to closer cooperation.

- 2. Fawzi Bey (Egypt) drew attention to the inaction of the United Nations on the two questions of protection for minorities and resettlement of displaced persons. In the latter operation all countries should take a share.
- 3. Masaryk reiterated the view already expressed by the Czech Delegation that the Colonial Secretary's statement had greatly increased the responsibility of the United Nations. He expressed support in principle for majority plan.
- UNSCOP plans and speke only of the eleven unanimous

 A recommendations. He proposed an immediate recommendation to
 the Assembly to act on Number 11 and the appointment of a subcommittee to consider means of giving effect to number 6.
 - the Jewish agency and the Arab Higher Committee to appoint three representatives each to meet in conference and to report to the present session of the Assembly on the results of their meeting.

6. Chairman hopes to close the general debate on Friday.

Fereigh Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 80.

[Cepies sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

0000

E 9372

9 OCT

PALESTINE

Registry Number | E9372/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No. M'Evans Recrit

Dated.

Received 720
in Registry 80

After (E9219/97/31) four of Cyab Keeders are knowing alarmed of graphet of British with drawed from Polistine Rhigh guraf afapped of the obot according to report Range almosty forty loss for planet with a property of the forty and among rank and for eccupying country by heart, on pron as

Last Paper.

9370

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Matheexis Oct. 10 (Minutes.)

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The arabs would obviously like us to remove all Jews from Polestine before methodraming. I are not reason when we should endeavour to reason with the more formible results their about the name formible results of a foling of where sincerity they shouly out it is hard too one look will any one, it is hard too one look will be any one, it is hard too one look will be any one.

bre can't do any thing lat present.

But when we go we shall want to leave some hidy in charge

and we hope it wan be an Arab- devish administration. I think that should be one hime.

Mrs Beins Ort. 9

The greation of how we withdraw will need very careful consideration in due course, but the me the cause in any care commissions to consulting the careful in any care cannil anselves to consulting

(Action completed.)	(Index.
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Next Paper.

E9374

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2 3 4 5 6 Reference: - 374

/ www.

It. see sir O. tangent's minute on the copy of the tel. within. I have referred to this some in a draft saper on varnon; asperts of withdrawal, now

S4. Carilla Costanial de la constante de la co

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM BETRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Evans No. 720 D. 8.54 p.m. 8th October 1947 R.12.15 a.m. 9th October 1947

8th October 1947.

Repeated to

Cairo
B.M.E.O. Cairo
Bagdad
U.K. Delegation New York
Jedda
Jerusalen
Amman Saving
Damascus Saving

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

Palestine.

Judging by what Sheik Yussuf Yassin told me on October 7th at a reception given at Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to mark the opening session of Arab League Council, some of the Arab leaders are beginning to be alarmed at the prospect of a British withdrawal from Palestine. He said that according to withdrawal from Palestine. He said that according to information received from Arab Delegations at New York information received from Arab Delegations at New York the Zionists had plans already drawn up for flooding Palestine with immigrants and for occupying the country by force as soon as British evacuation was started.

- 2. When I reminded Sheik Yussuf that Arabs had always demanded termination of the mandate he replied that this was so, but that the Arabs had also demanded an independent Arab (repeat Arab) Palestine. Were His Majesty's Government, he asked, proposing to leave the Arabs to their fate? For 25 years His Majesty's Government had assisted the Jews; what assistance would they now give the Arabs? From Arab point of view the important issue was how the British withdrawal would be effected. Would there be a hand over and if so to whom? Could not His Majesty's Government and Arab Governments reach some agreement on this vital aspect of the problem?
- 3. I told Sheik Yussuf that while I could neither confirm or deny reports referred to in paragraph 1 above I personally thought that it would be folly on the part of the Arabs to minimise gravity of the situation and as the High Commissioner for Palestine had recently told the High Commissioner for Palestine had recently told the High and Ben Gurion, both [gps.undec. ? Jews and] Arabs should realise that this was their last chance of

/coming....

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference:-FO 371 61881

4. Although I realise that nothing can at present be added to Colonial Secretary's statement (paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 619) it would nevertheless appear to be to our advantage that if practicable the Arabs should in some way be reassured in connexion with fears referred to in paragraph 2 above; otherwise there is a danger that goodwill created by Colonial Secretary's statement will be more than off-set.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No. 23 and Cairo to British Middle East Office as my telegram No. 167.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York].

v v v

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A 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: FO 371 61881

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Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Evans No. 720 D. 8.54 p.m. 8th October 1947 R.12.15 a.m. 9th October 1947

E.9372

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8th October 1947.

Repeated to C

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B.M.E.O. Caire
Bagdad

U.K. Delegation New York Jedda

Jerusalem Amman Saving Damascus Saving

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

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OCT VIII A SHIP

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Fereign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my tolegram No. 28 and Cairo to British Middle East Office as my tolegram No. 167.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation Now York].

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Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Dundas
No. 436
7th October, 1947.
Repeated to Bagdad
Cairo

D. 7:44a.m. 8th October, 1947.R. 9.20a.m. 8th October, 1947.

Cairo Jerusalem Jedda Cairo B.M.E.O. Beirut Saving Amman Saving E 9382

LIGHT

Syrian President sent for me to-day and immediately began to orate about Palestine. I took the opportunity of speaking as instructed in your telegram No. 514.

- 2. He appeared to be convinced that no solution acceptable to the Arabs would be reached by the United Nations and asked whether the British Army were to go, where it would go and whether it would leave Arab or Jewish parts first.
- questions he went on to urge that personal and confidential discussions should take place immediately between heads of each Arab state and accredited British representatives as to how British withdrawal should be carried out. He particularly stressed that any such discussions should be secret and that fire-brands such as Saleh Jaber should be given no opportunity to take part. The British Army, he said, had been in Palestine for thirty years and if it left overnight Arab countries would have to help their brothers in Palestine against Jews since Arabs were unarmed and had no money.
- 4. I emphasised the desirability of an agreed solution being reached and of Arab states in any case abiding by United Nations decisions, but I fear that I made no impression. He would discuss only what could be done to ensure that evacuation of British troops from Palestine would not lead to massacre or bloodshed "as in India". I had no doubt he personally at least is convinced that we are in earnest and fears results of British withdrawal.
 - 5. I undertook to put this proposal before you.

Jerusalem please pass to Amman as my telegram No. 80 and Cairo to Middle East Minister as my telegram No. 65.



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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: FO 371 61881

42	E	E 9403
1947	PALESTINE	10 OCT
Registry E9403/951/31. TELEGRAM FROM M'HEAS No. Believe t Dated Received in Registry Soft	Action #0 til 619 (E 9219) April # Juney Japan Altrongly about a any re response le (exall were statement lightly at a fringen and follow Tales a thinking in trans	ent, arab Reactions. [951/31] a authorized to be expection that berologic recting believes they be appeared to the transformat the arabinal strages were till economic toy coult.
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Cypher/OTP

E 9403

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evans
No. 722
8th October, 1947.

D. 9.22 a.m. 9th October, 1947.

R. 11.48 a.m. 9th October, 1947.

Repeated to Cairo (British Middle East Office)

Bagdad
Jedda
Jerusalem
New York (United Kingdom Delegation)
Damascus) Saving
Amman)

SECRET

Your telegram No. 619; Palestine.

I spoke to Sheik Yussuf Yassin as authorised.

- 2. Sheik Yussuf strongly denied any suggestion that responsible Arabs were treating the Colonial Secretary's statement lightly.
- decisions he said it looked as if Saleh Jabbr's position was unchanged. At an informal meeting between Saleh Jabbr Jamil Mardan and himself, it became apparent that the Iraqis were still thinking in terms of an economic boycott of Great Britain and the United States. It was the wish of Saleh Jabbr that His Majesty's Government and United States Government should be officially informed that if a solution unfavourable to the Arabs was accepted at United Nations, economic relations would be cut off. An attempt by Jamil Mardam to point out that a new situation had been created by the Colonial Secretary's statement did not have much effect. Sheik Yussuf said he himself had preferred to say nothing and to bide his time.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No. 25 and Cairo to British Middle East Office as my telegram No. 169.

[Repeated to United Kingdem Delegation New York by Foreign Office]

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1947

E

PALESTINE

15 5464

Registry
Number & 9404/951/31.

FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

8,00

In receipt of UNSCOP. report, legan study of majority plan a race HMg were alled upon to looke part a their complementation and immediately met various raggs no proposal to apply International Treatection septem to lety of Enricolum. Employers dropped dependent former deany on some to 11/2 cite for

Last Paper

9403

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(Print)

(How disposed of)

NAT Matherson

(Minutes.

The Co. admit that this is Somewhat of an academic exercise: but they think we ought to work it out. UN. (bor.) Dept.

do you concur?

25. Beins 01. 10

I agree that the problem is at prosent academic, but it may be well to be proposed, and the tages draft despetch can do no evanu in explains the possibilities.

As regards the insteading aspect, S agree with the C.O. views. The most important snag is that mentioned in para. It of the despotch.

The suggested Statute for he cely will be a tricky pusiness. I do not know whether it is contemplated to isolate the city as a wind of Vatican but leave to economic relations with Polestine undisturbed, or include a limitational on the Trieste model. The former seems the soviers choice, as only object is to preserve it as a religious shrine.

completed)

(Action

Next Paper

9405

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would have to be gone into easifully in due course. The "integrity or independence" of Trieste, for example is supposed to be assured by the Security Council. We should have to consider the descrability of this applying to Tensalem if it were set up on the Trieste model.

As a first step, I would approve of the C.O. Aft. but his sept. would eithe to see further developments a have a chance to comment.

Letulus 1910

I have so informed Mr Mathieson Co. in the attribed draft.

B out. 14

9. P.P. & V. bound Ut Res Williams dispersion NO 28 to 11/c Palistine dated 21/10 JBOW, 22

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TOP SECRET

My Reference 75872/158.

Your Reference

I'ly dear Beill,

Colonial Office, 17 Church House, Great Smith Street, London, S.W. 1.

When we received the UNSCOP report we naturally began to study the practical implications of the majority recommendations in case we should be called upon to take part in their implementation. We immediately came up against various snags in connexion with the proposal to apply the International Trusteeship System to the City of Jerusalem. We have embodied our views on this point in the enclosed draft despatch and we should be grateful to know if you or your United Nations department have any comments to make on it.

You may feel that the detailed examination of the UNSCOP recommendations at the stage we have now reached is of little practical value. Whatever the outcome of the Assembly deliberations, however, I think it is reasonable to assume that some special treatment may be necessary for the City of Jerusalem and we should like to have an agreed view on the mechanism for dealing with the problem.

Tour eve, Little Nathuison

(W.A.C. Mathieson)

J.G.S. BEITH, ESQ.

DRAFT DESPATCH

FOR FOREIGN OFFICE CONCURRENCE

HIGH COMMISSIONER, TOP SECRET

PALESTINE.

- I have the honour to refer to your Top

 Secret and Personal telegram No.1691 of the

 8th September 1947 in paragraph 6 of which it was suggested that the drafting of a trusteeship agreement for the City of Jerusalem as recommended in the majority recommendation of the United Nations

 Special Committee on Palestine, should begin forthwith.
- 2. I have considered the majority recommendations regarding the City of Jerusalem in part 3 of Chapter VI of the report, in particular the statement that "the International Trusteeship System is the most suitable method for meeting this special problem, for the reason that the Trusteeship Council, as a principal organ of the United Nations, affords a convenient and effective means of ensuring both the desired international supervision and the well-being of the population". I have however the gravest doubts whether the International Trusteeship System, as defined in the United Nations Charter and as interpreted by H.M.G. both in the United Nations and in the trust territories for which H.M.G. is already the Administering Authority, is the proper instrument to implement the recommendations relating to the City of Jerusalem.
- 3. In the first place, the basic objectives of the International Trusteeship System, as laid down in Chapter XII of the Charter of the United Nations, include the progressive development towards ælf-government or independence of the peoples concerned in/

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in accordance with their freely expressed wishes. Ιt cannot be maintained that the constitution proposed for the City of Jerusalem could provide for the attainment of these objectives. No mention is made in the report of promoting the capacity of the inhabitants for selfgovernment nor of consulting their wishes, nor is the City to be allowed to govern itself or to join either the Arab or Indeed the intention of the plan is to place Jewish States. the City of Jerusalem permanently under international supervision, in order to ensure religious peace and free access to the Holy It would in fact in my view be impossible to draft Places. in the form of a Trusteeship Agreement a constitution which would both implement the clear sense of the recommendations and at the same time be consistent with the attainment of the basic objectives of the International Trusteeship System.

Secondly, I do not consider that the functions of the Trusteeship Council as defined in the Charter make it a proper body to exercise international supervision over the proposed The Trusteeship Council is not in permanent session regime. but meets only twice a year, for approximately one month, in June and November. It has no executive powers but operates by permissive authority to receive annual reports from the Administering Authorities; accept petitions concerning the trust territories; and make periodic visits to those I am most anxious that these permissive powers territories. should not be extended so as to give the Council executive supervision over any trust territory, which would be clearly necessary if the effective government of the City of Jerusalem were to be carried out in the way the Majority Report intends. Any grant of executive powers, however limited, in this particular case might well prove a most embarrassing precedent for intervention by the Council in other non-self-governing territories at some future date.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: TO 371 64001

I have, therefore, reached the conclusion that a Trusteeship Agreement is not a suitable instrument for the solution of the problem of providing an international regime for the City of On the assumption that some form of Jerusalem. international regime is to be established, therefore, some alternative method must be found of giving Should the majority effect to this decision. recommendation be approved by the General Assembly a special sub-committee (on which H.M.G. would no doubt obtain a seat) will presumably be charged with working out a detailed plan for the City. Such a sub-committee could hardly be expected to function properly without the advice and unique experience If such a body were set of the Mandatory Power. up, H.M.G.'s representative on it would have to be instructed to oppose any proposal of a Trusteeship Agreement for the reasons given above, and urge instead that some form of Statute should be framed for the City which could be endorsed by resolution It would seem most advisable of the General Assembly. from the point of view of practical administration that such a Statute should be drawn up in wide terms allowing/

 allowing the maximum flexibility on all but the essentials, in order that the actual City government might be developed and amended locally in the light of circumstances without undue argument and delay. Useful precedents might be found in the International Zone of Tangier and the Free City of Trieste. The representative of H.M.G. might have available, for submission at a suitable stage, a draft prepared along these lines; though the formal wording and promulgation of the Statute, if accepted in principle, would of course have to be an international responsibility.

- 7. Another point that would have to be considered is the legal status of the inhabitants of the City under such a Statute. The majority plan would permit them to adopt the citizenship of either State. It would however appear desirable that some form of "international status", on the analogy of that conferred upon the holders of Nansen Passports, should also be conferred upon them, with a provision for dual nationality enabling those who so wished to enjoy, in addition to their international status, a citizenship of either the Jewish or the Arab State.
- 8. I submit the foregoing suggestions for your consideration and would be grateful to know your views particularly as to the lines along which the Statute for the City might be drafted.

I have, etc.,

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Registry

Colonial Office.

J.5.5. (from Mr. Beith)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.6a-~ E9404/951/31. OUT Dear Railieson, 6 October 1947

We Thank you for your letter of October 8th on the subject of the difficulties adherent in applying the International Trusteeship system to the City of Jerusalem.

I have shown your letter to our United W.A.C. Mathieson Esq, Nations Department, who agree with you that, while the problem is at present academic, it will be well to be prepared. They agree with your draft and ask to be informed t ehemn any further developments.

Doct. 14

Yours sincerely

(Sqd.) John Beich



OUT FILE 23

FORRIGN OFFICE. S. W.1.

16th October, 1947.

(E 9404/951/31)

Thank you for your letter of October 8th on the subject of the difficulties inherent in applying the International Trusteeship system to the City of Jerusalem.

I have shown your letter to our United Nations Department, who agree with you that, while the problem is at present academic, it will be well to look into it. They agree with your draft and ask to be informed of any further developments.


Worldware extreme meals

(Sgd.) 90 hun Beith

(J.G.S. Beith)

W. A. C. Mathieson, Esq., Colonial Office.

///



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The Church House,
Great Smith treet,
London, S.W.l.

PALICUTIES

No. 28.

TOP SECRET

4r October, 1947.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your Top Secret and Personal telegram No. 1691 of the 8th September, 1947 in paragraph 6 of which it was suggested that the drafting of a trusteeship agreement for the City of Jerusalem as recommended in the majority recommendation of the United Nations Special Committee on Talestine, should begin forthwith.

- I have considered the majority recommendations regarding the City of Jerusalem in part 3 of Chapter VI of the report, in particular the statement that "the International Trusteeship System is the most suitable method for meeting this special problem, for the reason that the Trusteeship Council, as a principal organ of the United Metions, affords a convenient and effective means of ensuring both the desired international supervision and the well-being of the population". I have however the gravest doubts whether the International Trusteeship System, as defined in the United Mations Charter and as interpreted by his Mejesty's Government both in the United Mations and in the trust territories for which His Majesty's Government is already the Administering Authority, is the proper instrument to implement the recommendations relating to the City of Jerusalem.
- In the first place, the besic objectives of the International Trusteeship Tystem, as laid down in Chapter XII of the Charter of the United Nations, include the progressive development towards self-government or independence of the peoples concerned in accordance with their freely expressed wishes. It cannot be maintained that the constitution proposed for the City of Jerusalem could provide for the attairment of these objectives. No mention is made in the report of promoting the capacity of the inhabitants for self-government nor of consulting their wishes, nor is the City to be allowed to govern itself or to join either the Arab or Jewish States. Indeed the intention of the plan is to place the City of Jerusalem permanently under international supervision, in order to ensure religious peace and free access to the Holy Places. It would in fact in my view be impossible to draft in the form of a Trusteeship Agreement a constitution which would both implement the clear sense of the recommendations and at the same time be consistent with the attainment of the basic objectives of the International Trustceship System.

the Trusteeship Council as defined in the Charter make it a proper body to exercise international supervision over the

proposed/

HIGH COMMICSIONER

G GARRAL SIR SEAW COMMINGHAM, R.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.

WIC.,

proposed regime. The Trusteeship Council is not in permanent session but meets only twice a year, for approximately one month, in June and November. It has no executive powers but operates by permissive authority to receive annual reports from the Administering Authorities; accept petitions concerning the trust territories; and make periodic visits to those territories. I am most anxious that these permissive powers should not be extended so as to give the Council executive supervision over any trust territory, which would be clearly necessary if the effective government of the City of Jerusalem were to be carried out in the way the Majority Report intends. Any grant of executive powers, however limited, in this particular case might well prove a most embarraceing precedent for intervention by the Council in other non-self-governing territories at some future date.

- Trusteeship System to this case would arise from the fact that, in accordance with Article 79 of the Charter, any terms of trusteeship require to be agreed upon by the "States directly concerned". Although no agreed definition of this phrase exists, the Arab States members of the United Nations could certainly use this provision to delay or postpone approval by the Assembly of any Trusteeship Agreement which did not commend itself to those States.
- I have, therefore, reached the conclusion that a Trustoeship Agreement is not a suitable instrument for the solution of the problem of providing an international regime for the City of Jerusalem. On the assumption that some form of international regime is to be established, therefore, some alternative method must be found of giving effect to this decision. Should the majority recommendation be approved by the General Assembly a special sub-committee (on which His Majesty's Government would no doubt obtain a seat) will presumably be charged with working out a detailed plan for the City. Such a sub-committee could hardly be expected to function properly without the advice and unique experience of the Handatory Power. If such a body were set up, His Majesty's Government's representative on it would have to be instructed to oppose any proposal of a Trusteeship Agreement for the reasons given above, and urge instead that some form of Statute should be framed for the City which could be endorsed by resolution of the Ceneral Assembly. It would seem most advisable from the point of view of practical administration that such a Statute should be drawn up in wide terms allowing the maximum flexibility on all but the essentials, in order that the actual City government might be developed and amended locally in the light of circumstances without undue argument and delay. Useful precedents might be found in the International Mone of Tangier and the Free city of Trieste. The representative of His Hajesty's Government might have available, for submission at a suitable stage, a draft prepared along these lines; though the formal wording and promulgation of the Statute, if accepted in principle, would of course have to be an international responsibility.
- the legal status of the inhabitants of the City under such a statute. The majority plan would permit them to adopt the citizenship of either State. It would however appear desirable that some form of "international status", on the analogy of that conferred upon the holders of Nansen Feesports, should also be conferred upon them, with a provision for dual nationality

enabling those who so wished to enjoy, in addition to their international status, a citizenship of either the Jewish of the Arab State.

6. I submit the foregoing suggestions for your consideration and would be grateful to know your views particularly as to the lines along which the Statute for the City might be drafted.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your most obedient, humble servant,

(SSA) & Rees Louis

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PALESTINE

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FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 2844.

D. 12.3 a.m. 10th October 1947.

9th October 1947.

R. 6.30 a.m. 10th October 1947

93

Repeated to: Jerusalem

and Saving to Washington.

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IMMEDIATE.

GIANT.

My telegram No. 2830.

Palestine Committee.

Adil Arslan (Syria) opened the discussion at Ninth Meeting on 9th October. He believed that the latest decision of His Majesty's Government was in conformity with the conscience of the British people. He rejected partition because a Jewish state would be dangerous both in itself and through the alliances it might make. Referring to the Uruguayan and Polish speeches he said that if question at issue related only to 30,000 orphans the Arabs would not only accept them but take them into their homes. These children however were an element in a political campaign. Why did Jews wish to leave Europe? Were there countries in Europe still under dictatorship? who was preventing Jews from returning to their countries of origin? Who was still persecuting them? Most of the Jewish displaced persons had fled from Poland.

- 2. Sandler (Sweden) asked Committee to consider situation which would arise in Palestine if Assembly failed to find a solution. In his view a solution could be found on basis of Unscop majority plan. But Committee must consider means of implementing a solution, at same time as the form of solution itself. There must be an address to which the Assembly could forward its recommendations. Most suitable address for this purpose would be the Security Council. If enforcement was to be entrusted to Security Council it was important that solution recommended should command approval of members of the Council, in particular of its permanent members.
- 3. Replying to an allusion in Syrian speech, Castro (El Salvador) said that his Government would co-operate in international measures for resettlement of refugees.
- 4. After an hour and a quarter it was found that no other delegate wished to speak today. Zafurulla Khan

then



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then caused a brief flutter by proposing the immediate closure of general debate. Committee finally decided that list of speakers should be closed on Saturday.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No.81.

[Copies sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE,

Mr. Evans,

D: 3.58 p.m. 8th October, 1947

No. 718 8th October, 1947.

R: 10.50 p.m. 8th October, 1947.

Repeated to Cairo,
British Middle East Office Cairo,
Bagdad,
Damascus,
Amman,
Jedda,
Jerusalem,
United Kingdom Delegation New York.

Arab League.

The seventh ordinary session of the Arab League Council opened in Beirut on October 7th. Inaugural meeting was held in public and, after reading of a message from the President of the Republic, speeches were delivered by Yussef Yassin (Chairman of last session), Riad Bey Solh (who will preside during the present session) and Azzam Pasha.

2. Following is gist of speeches. The Council will be called upon to discuss two important questions, Palestine and Egypt. All speeches emphasised extreme criticism of the stage which had been reached in the Palestine question. Yussef expressed the hope that the Egyptian case would soon be settled and that the desire of Egypt and her valley would be fulfilled. Riad Bey Solh said Arabs were determined not to surrender their rights ner to accept partition or invasion of their territory and recalled that the Political Committee had declared that Arab countries would assist the Palestine Arabs with men, money and arms. As regards Egypt she continues, he said, to demand her rights and will achieve her objective viz the strengthening of her independence and the unity of her valley; the sentiments of sister Arab States would be of great assistance to her. Azzam Pasha stated the arab League was faced with two fundamental forces which impeded its freedom of progress, European colonization and Zienism. The fermer [grp. undec. ? in time] will have disappeared but Zionism relying on strong religious and communal sentiments had directed its hopes towards Palestine. The Arabs had pledged themselves to preserve the Arabic character of Palestine for ever and would sacrifice their wealth and lives in that course. Arabs hoped the Jews of the world would realise the state of hysteria in which their leaders and organisations lived would lead to a violent struggle between them and the Arabs.

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3. There was no mention of the Colonial Secretary's statement in the speeches, speaking to journalists before the meeting Azzam Pasha however stated that British mandate over Palestine had become a corpse which should be thrown out.

4. Council will meet in secret session this evening.

Caire please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No.166 and Fereign Office to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No.22.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York by Foreign Office.]

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2. bustiles 63, Royal

63, Royal Hospital Road,

Flaxman 1839.

Chelsea, S.W. 3.

4th October 1947.

Dear Mr. Bevin,

As an ex-High Commissioner of Palestine, I venture to congratulate you upon the admirable statement of the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Palestine, which was made to the United Nations Committee by Mr. Creech Jones on the 26th of September. No previous Government has made such a clear and explicit announcement of its policy and intentions.

I trust that His Majesty's Government will be able successfully to resist the pressure that will certainly be brought to bear upon them from all quarters to induce them to continue to undertake the thankless task of keeping order in Palestine.

Although His Majesty's Government have stated that "if the Assembly should recommend a policy which is not "acceptable to the Jews and the Arabs, the United Kingdom 'Government would not feel able to implement it. "would be necessary to provide some alternative authority to "implement it," I was concerned to read in the leading article in the "Times" of the 27th of September the following passage, "Whether Britain will join with other powers in enforcing a "settlement of this nature (i.e. one which is not acceptable "to both Arabs and Jews) must depend first upon the British "view of its inherent justice, and secondly upon the British "estimate of the extent to which force would require to be "employed.....If support can be secured from men of good will "and moderation on either side, the resistance of more fanatical 'and intransigent elements, however bitter and even dangerous, 'might not sway this country's decision."

Having regard to the present state of Palestine, who can measure in advance the extent to which force would have to be employed to impose upon the Arabs and the Jews a decision that is repugnant to both parties?

I earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government will not be enticed into taking a share in enforcing such a decision by the illusory hope that there are in Palestine men of good

will and moderation on either side who could overcome the resistance of the more fanatical and intransigent elements.

The experience of recent years in Palestine shows that men of good will and moderation are powerless against the terrorists and extremists.

Yours sincerely,

J.R. Chancellor

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PALESTINE

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FROM EX ON CIPY

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British Legation,

Beirut.

80/28/47.

30th September, 1947.

Dear Department,

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With reference to our telegram No. 692 of September 29th regarding the publication of a letter addressed to U.N.S.C.O.P. last July by Monseigneur Moubarak, we enclose a newspaper extract giving the text of Monseigneur Moubarak's letter and a further extract giving an account of a meeting of the Chamber of Deputies on September 29th which was entirely devoted to a discussion of Monseigneur Moubarak's letter.

- It will be seen from the second extract 2. referred to above that the Maronite deputies completely dissociated themselves with Monseigneur Moubarak's statements and also that the Maronite Patriarch, Monseigneur Arida, sent a separate letter to the Prime Minister stating that Monseigneur Moubarak's views, with which he disagreed, were personal and could in no way be held to represent those of the Maronite community.
- Though in their heart of hearts many Lebanese Christians, particularly the reactionary elements who are opposed to the present régime, share the sentiments expressed by Monseigneur Moubarak, at least as far as

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Eastern Department, FOREIGN OFFICE.

OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON 10 CCT 1047 8EX (10 0EP).

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the Christian National Home in the Lebanon is concerned, the great majority realise the danger of openly antagonising the Moslems and condemn the Archbishop's action. There is little doubt that the Government seized on the opportunity to discredit Monseigneur Moubarak. They too were playing a very dangerous game and were at pains to prevent the demonstrations which marked yesterday's general strike developing on Moslem V Christian lines. They have fortunately been successful.


We are sending copies of this letter and enclosures to the Legation at Damascus and to British Middle East Office.

Yours ever,

Chancery.



Reference:-



Texte intégral de la lettre de Mør. Moubarak à M. Sandstrom, Président de l'UNSCOP.

Monsieur le Président,

Je regrette que mon absence en Europe ait coincidé avec le passage de la Commission d'Enquete sur la Palestine au Liban, j'aurais eu ainsi l'opportunité de faire entendre ma voix et de donner mon avis qui est d'ailleurs celui de la majorité des Libanais -, sur la question qui vous intéresse.

Ce n'est pas la première fois que j'exprime mon opinion sur cette affaire. Beaucoup d'encre a été déjà versée et après chacune de mes réclamations, la presse mondiale s'en est saisie et commenté mes déclarations.

Dans ce Moyen-Orient à majorité musulmane, si on reconnait au gouvernement libanais actuel un caractère officiel pour s'exprimer au nom de la Nation Libanaise, nous serions disposés à répondre et à prouver que les Maitres de l'Heure ne representent qu'eux-memes et que leurs déclarations, prétendument officielles, ne sont dictées que par les nécessités du moment et par la solidarité imposée qui lie ce pays, à majorité chrétienne, aux autres pays islamiques qui l'entourent et l'englobent, malgré lui, dans leur orbite politico-économique.

Le Liban, de par sa situation géographique, son histoire, sa culture, ses traditions, le caractère de ses habitants, et leur attachement à leur foi et à leur idéal, s'est toujours dérobé, et meme sous le joug ottoman, à l'emprise des autres peuples qui l'entourent et a réussi à maintenir ses traditions intangibles.

La Palestine, par contre, centre idéologique de toute la propagande de l'Ancien et du Nouveau Testament, a été l'objet de toutes les vexations et de toutes les pérsécutions. De tout temps, tout ce qui peut rappeler un souvenir tant soit peu historique a été saccagé, pillé et mutilé. Des temples et des églises ont été transformes en mosquées et le role de cette partie orientale de la Méditerranée a été réduit au néant.

Il est indéniable, historiquement, que la Palestine a été la patrie des Juifs et des premiers Chrétiens. Aucun d'eux n'était d'origine arabe. La force brutale de la conquete de la Palestine les a contraints à se convertir à la religion musulmane.

Voilà l'origine des Arabes dans ce pays. Peut-on déduire de là que la Palestine est arabe et qu'elle fut toujours arabe?

Les vestiges historiques, les monuments, les souvenirs sacrés des deux religions demeurent là vivants pour attester que ce pays a vécu en dehors des guerres intestines arabes que se livraient les princes et monarques d'Iraq et d'Arabie. Les Lieux Saints, les Temples, le Mur des Lamentations, les Eglises et les Tombes des Prophètes et des Saints, en un mot, tous les souvenirs des deux religions sont des symboles vivants qui renient, à eux seuls, les assertions présentes de ceux qui sont intéressés à faire de la Palestine, un pays arabe. Englober la Palestine et le Liban dans le cadre des pays arabes, c'est renier l'Histoire et détruire l'équilibre social dans le Proche-Orient.

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/Ces ...

Ces deux pays, ces deux foyers prouvent jusqu'aujourd'hui l'utilité et la nécessité de leur existence comme entité séparée et indépendante.

Le Liban d'abord a toujours été et demeure le refuge de tous les persécutés chrétiens du Moyen-Onent. C'est là que les Arméniens, persécutés en Turquie, ont trouvé refuge. C'est là que les Chaldéens d'Iraq, pour chassés de leur pays, ont trouvé asile. C'est là que se réfugièrent les Polonais, traqués de l'Europe en feu.

C'est là que les Français, refoulés de Syrie, s'y sont trouvés en sécurité.

C'est là que les familles anglaises de Palestine, fuyant le terrorisme, ont reçu le gite et l'abri.

Le Liban comme la Palestine devront demeurer les foyers permanents des minoritaires.

Quel a été le role des Juifs en Palestine?

Etudiée sous cet angle, la Palestine de 1918, nous apparait comme un pays aride, pauvre, dénué de toute ressource et le moins évolué de tous les vilayets turcs voisins.

La Colonie musulmane qui y habite frise la misère. L'immigration juive commence, des colonies se forment et s'établissent. En moins de vingt ans, le pays est fransformé; c'est la prospérité dans les cultures, l'installation des grandes industries; c'est la richesse qui s'installe dans ce pays. La présence à coté du Liban, d'un peuple si évolué et travailleur ne peut que contribuer au bien-etre de tous.

Le Juif est réalisateur, le Libenais est très enclin à l'adaptation, c'est pourquoi ce voisinage ne pourra que servir à l'amélioration de toutes les conditions d'existence des habitants.

Au point de vue culturel, ces deux peuples peuvent se vanter de posséder, à eux seuls, autant d'intellectuels que tous les pays réunis du Proche Orient. Il n'est pas juste que la loi soit imposée par une majorité ignorante qui veut imposer sa volonté.

Il ne serait pas juste qu'un million d'humains, évolués et instruits, soient le jouet de quelques personnes intéressées se trouvant à la tete ou menant quelques millions d'individus arriérés ou peu progressifs et faisant la loi comme ils le désirent. Il existe un ordre dans le monde. C'est toujours cet ordre qui l'équilibre. Si les Nations Unies ont à coeur de le maintenir, elles devront mettre tout en oeuvre pour le consolider.

Des raisons majeures, sociales, humaines et religieuses exigent qu'il soit créé dans ces deux pays, deux foyers, pour les minorités: Un Foyer chrétien au Liban, comme il l'a toujours été; un Foyer juif en Palestine.

Ces deux centres qui se relient géographiquement l'un à l'autre, s'appuyant et s'entr'aidant économiquement, formeront le pont indispensable entre l'Occident et l'Orient tant au point de vue culturel, qu'au point de vue civiliaateur.

Le voisinage de ces deux peuples contribuera à maintenir la paix dans ce Proche Orient si divisé par les rivalités et réduira les

/persécultions ...

persécutions des minorités qui trouveront toujours un asile dans l'un de ces deux pays.

Voilà l'opinion des Libenais que je représente, voulà l'opinion de ce peuple que votre Commission d'Enquete n'a pu entendre.

Derrière les volets clos de l'Hotel de Sofar, vous n'avez pu écouter que les paroles dictées à nos représentants, soi-disant légaux, par leurs maitres et seigneurs des pays arabes musulmans voisins. La véritable voix libanaise a été étouffée par la horde des faussaires des élections du 25 Mai.

Le Liban réclame la Liberté pour les Juifs de Palestine, comme il souhaite sa propre liberté et son indépendance.



Extract from Le Jour of 30th September, 1947

CHAMBRE DES DEPUTES

LES DEPUTES MARONITES CONDAMNENT L'ATTITUDE DE Mgr. MOBARAK

Motion de confiance en faveur du Gouvernement

Le mémoire adressé par S.E. Mgr. ignace Mobarak, archevéque maronite de Beyrouth à 1'U.N.S.C.O.P. lors de son séjour au Liban a été évoqué hier à la Chambre. L'Assemblée lui a consacré la totalité des débats.

Prenant la parole au nom des députés maronites, le Dr. Raif
Bellama announce que ces derniers avaient tenu une réunion dans la
journée et approuvé à la unanimité un texte dans lequel ils condamnent
l'attitude de l'Archevêque maronite de Beyrouth. Le Dr. Raif Bellama
critique sévèrement la volteface de Mgr. Mobarak qui avait fortement
contribué à la consolidation du régime d'indépendance et obtenu pour
son activité "la Medaille de l'Indépendance". Il réaffirme l'indéfectible
attachement des Libanais de tous rites à l'intégrité du Liban dans ses
frontières et dans le cadre des stipulations de la Charte de la Ligue
arabe. "Au même titre que leurs autres compatriotes, a-t-il ajouté, les
Maronites ont à coeur la cause palestinienne. Le délégués libanais qui
défendent actuellement cette cause à travers le monde, notamment
MM Camille Chamoun. Hamid Frangié Victor Khoury, Cheikh Sami El-Khoury,
et bien d'autres, appartiennent en effet à la communauté maronite".

Succédant à la tribune au Dr. Bellama, M. Wadih Naim donne lecture de la lettre des députés maronites. Celle-ci comporte les trois points suivants:

- (1) La communauté maronite désavoue entièrement le mémoire de Mgr. Mobarak ainsi que ses précédents manifestes.
- (2) Mgr. Mobarak n'a aucune qualité pour engager la responsabilité de sa communauté.
- (3) Le Président de la République, la Chambre et le Gouvernement ont interprété fidèlement le sentiment du pays en définissant sa position dans la question palestinienne.

La lettre ajoute que le Liban appartient à toutes les communautés qui sont plus que jamais solidement unies et fermement attachées à la souveaineté l'intégrité et l'indépendance de leur patrie.

Deux députes n'ont pas signé la lettre en question: M. Amine Makhlé, que ses collèques n'avaient pas pu atteindre et M. Joseph Karam qui est contre le principe de la politique des manifestes mais qui, en la présente circonstance, se rallie sans réserves à la démarche de ses collègues maronites.

D'autres députés maronites, M. Ibrahim Azar, Georges Zouein, Cheikh Farid El-Khazen, Khalil Abi-Jaoudé et Joseph Karam, interviennent successivement au cours des débats pour s'élever avec énergie contre la malheureuse initiative de Mgr. Mobarak. Ils mettent en relief la volonté des Libanais, appartenant à toutes les communautés de vivre dans l'union et la concorde.

M. Ibrahim Azar souligne l'appui que la cause arabe trouve auprès du Saint-Siege et le désaveu infligé derniérement par S.B. Mgr. Arida à S.E. Mgr. Ignace Mobarak pour son opposition à l'égard du Gouvernement.

D'autres députés non maronites, notamment M. Kamal Djomblatt

M. Nassar Golmieh et M. Safieddine, prennent également la parole.

M. Kémal Djomblatt fait observer que le Gouvernement doit se montrer sans pitié envers la minorité réactionnaire qui s'est constituée au Liban au lendemain de novembre 1943.

Intervenant en dernier lieu, M. Riad Solh annonce que Mgr. Ignace Mobarak a certifié l'authenticité du mémoire qui lui et attribué. "Le but de Mgr. Mobarak poursuit M. Solh est de semer la discorde parmi les Libanais. Les Libanais, ainsi que me l'ont dit les nombreuses personnes qui m'ont rendu visite dans la journée, sont assex lucides pour ne pas faire le jeu de Mgr. Mobarak. A ces personnes qui s'estimaient blessées dans leur fierté et leur personnes qui s'estimaient blessées dans leur fierté et leur amour-propre national, j'ai dit, que les Maronites sauront répondre à l'Archevê que de Beyrouth. La lettre des députés maronites est venue effacer la fâcheuse impression produite sur les membres des autres communautés. Quant à la grève, sa spontanéité et sa généralité, indiquent, une fois de plus l'unanimité du pays a l'égard, d'une part, de l'entité libanaise, et d'autre part envers la cause arabe de Palestine.

Abordant la question palestinienne M. Riad Solh announce que le Gouvernement et prêt à consentir tous les sacrifices en hommes, armes et argent pour le triomphe de la juste cause des Arabes de Palestine.

La séance et levée après que l'Assemblée adopte à l'unanimité une motion de MM. Ibrahim Azar et Ahmed Safieddine flétrissant le mémoire de Mgr. Mobarak, et approuvant le Gouvernement en lui faisant entière confiance.

Le Desaveu

De S.B. Mgr. Arida

M. Riad el Solh président du Conseil, a requ au cours de l'après-midi d'hier une lettre de S.B. Mgr. Arida, patriarche maronite, dans laquelle Sa Béatitude condamne le mémoire de Mgr. Mobarak. Le Patriarche déclare à ce sujet que si Mgr. Mobarak a rédigé ce mémoire, il ne l'a fait qu'à titre personnel et non au nom du Patriarche, ou de la communauté maronite.

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46

BRITISH EMBASSY.

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

4th October 1947

Ref: 15/316/47 RESTRICTED

Dear Department,

U.S. comment on the Colonial Secretary's statement on Palestine at Lake Success, which was headline news in all papers, may be summarised by saying that the decision of H.M.G. is generally welcomed, but that there is some criticism of their intention to withdraw from Palestine whatever happens, unless Jews and Arabs can agree on some solution. Agreement between the two communities is widely considered to be almost impossible at the present time and criticism of H.M.G. on that point is no doubt partly due to the unpleasant prospect that the U.S. Government may at last have to do something practical. As one wireless commentator put it, "handing the baby to the United Nations means

Early wireless comment, while taking note of the U.S. Zionists' attitude as typified in Rabbi Silver's phrase "Where's the catch?", was almost unanimous in expressing the view that H.M.G.'s statement of policy was sincere. Subsequent comment in the press has, with the exception of some of the strongly pro-Zionist newspapers, taken the same line. The New York Herald Tribune had an excellent editorial on the subject, a copy of which is enclosed.

handing it to the United States".

3. Thoughts are now fast turning to what will happen in the next year or two if Jews and Arabs do not agree. Here criticism of H.M.G. is typified by

Eastern Department, Foreign Office, London, S.W.1. /the

371 61881

RECORD OFFICE,

the enclosed editorial from the Philadelphia Inquirer entitled "No Time to Quit". There is a greater disposition to admit, although with some reluctance, that the U.S. Government ought now to bear a share of the burden, but also to hold, as does the St. Louis Post Dispatch, that the U.S. Government should not bear it alone. The present situation in Palestine, its editorial says, is due to conflicting promises made by the British Government to Jews and Arabs, and the British Government should therefore retain responsibility until the world community is ready to take over. The Baltimore Sun, while fully realising the gravity of the situation which may arise, takes a different line in saying that the U.N. can only hope to see their wishes carried out if Jews and Arabs agree with them. In resigning the Mandate, the British Government are really giving the ultimate responsibility for the fate of Palestine into the hands of the Jews and the Arabs. If the two communities are wise they will see that their best chance for a profitable future is to accept, even though with some disappointment, whatever compromise can be worked out by the United Nations.

Among the pro-Zionist newspapers, the New York Post does not express suspicion of British intentions; it concentrates on the great responsibility which the U.S. Government now bears for supporting and enforcing the majority proposals of the U.N. Special Committee. It suggests that one of the powers which signed the majority report should carry on the government of Palestine, backed by a police force recruited from among the other signatory powers. P.M., on the other hand, describes Mr. Creech-Jones' statement as a rejection of any solution which would require the unilateral use of British arms against a single Arab, though H.M. Government are still quite prepared to use force against Jewish immigrants.

Zionist comment, as already indicated, is cautious and in many cases suspicious. Zionist spokesmen have not said very much; all efforts are now directed towards securing the support of the U.S. Government for the majority recommendations of the Special Committee. Considerable alarm is being aroused in Zionist circles by reports that the U.S. Government is now becoming very much aware of the dangers which may be caused to its interests in the Middle East by a pro-Zionist policy. These fears were touched off by a broadcast by Drew Pearson on the 28th September which said that President Truman was considering a very important change of policy on Palestine, and by reports that Mr. Marshall, as a result of a luncheon which he gave to certain Arab leaders, at which they spoke of the cancellation of U.S. oil concessions, might now oppose partition. It is very difficult to discover what truth there is in all this, as the State Department are at present refusing to tell us, or anyone else, what line will be taken by the U.S. delegation in New York. We have had one or two indications that they are seriously worried, but this is of course nothing new, since the State Department were always aware of the wider implications of the Palestine problem, even when, largely for domestic reasons, they were being unhelpful. It is difficult to believe that the U.S. Government will oppose partition, but it seems unlikely that any statement will be made until the U.S. delegate at Lake Success has to make his government's position clear.

6. We are sending copies of this letter to Jerusalem and to the U.K. Delegation at New York.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY

AC.

OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LON DON



Britain Withdraws

With the statement yesterday of the British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Arthur Creech-Jones, the problem of Palestine takes on an altogether new shape. The unhappy history which was opened with the disingenuous Balfour Declaration of 1917 has, just thirty years later, reached its end. The problem may be no less acute than it was before; it must be faced now on quite different grounds; the appeals must be to other factors than those which have formed the stuff of the embittered controversies of the last three decades.

For the essence of the statement is that Great Britain is through. She is no longer prepared to carry the burden of political responsibility, of costly civil and military administration and of calumny in which the Palestine mendate has involved her. She believes the mandate should be terminated "now"; she will undertake to administer any agreed transition plan, but whe will not undertake to implement any plan which is not accepted by both Jews and Arabs. She will not herself impose any policy upon Palestine "by force of arms" and even if offered assistance by the United Nations will still reserve the right to judge for herself the justice of the settlement proposed. And in the absence of a settlement she "must plan for an early withdrawal of British forces and of the British administration from Palestine."

The statement seems cleaneout and unequivocal. It should relieve Great Britain of any further allegations that here is a policy of selfish imperialism, motivated by greed for oil, or military bases, or power. But it relieves her also of the pressure of passionate factions. Neither Zionists nor Arabs can any longer look to the achievement of their ends by browbeating Great Britain into securing them, American policians can no longer stop short with lofty declarations of the policies Britain ought to pursue while at the same time tacitly expecting Britain to sustain all the political, economic and strategic interests which are of importance to America in that area. The United Nations will have to deal with the problem on its own merits and American policy within U.N. will have to stand on its own responsibility.

The British withdrawal from the Palestine problem is going to cause serious difficulties, just as has the withdrawal of the British Raj from India; and, much as has happened in India, many of the bitterest critics of the mandate are going to realize with its collapse that the mandate had its values. Whatever difficulties or perils may now ensue, however, this newspaper believes that the British decision is as wise as it is honorable. The mandate has clearly proved unworkable. The way in which it distributed the various powers and responsibilities concerned was an impossible one. There could be no end to the bloody chaos of Palestine while that condition continued. Grave as are the issues with which the British withdrawal confronts all concerned, it provides the best hope for all concerned of achieving a viable solution.



Philadelphia Inquirer 27th September 1947

EDITORIALS.

NO TIME TO QUIT: PARTITION PALESTINE.

In the light of long-standing serious conditions in Palestine, Great Britain's proposal to pull out entirely was not unexpected. Nevertheless it threatens even more dangerous developments.

These must somehow be averted. The British announcement suddenly poses a problem of the first magnitude for the United Nations-not because Britain is saying she is going to get out, but in the manner of going.

No one of good will but must hope and pray that the United Nations will rise to thehigh responsibility imposed upon it by the Palestine problem and find a solution for it. The responsibility existed before British Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones yesterday told the Assembly his country has decided to end its 25 year old mandate over Palestine: that "in the absence of a settlement", the British Government "must plan for an early withdrawal of British forces and of the British administration."

That responsibility is now made more pointed and pressing by the British announcement, including the somewhat ambiguous observations Mr. Creech Jones tied to it.

For instance, he **Gaid** that he couldn't "easily imagine circumstances in which we should wish to prevent the application of a settlement recommended by the Assembly." This surely requires some clarification. Is Britain for partition, as recommended by the United Nations committee of investigation and suggested by boards of enquiry frequently in the last 10 years, or is Britain against it?

The United Nations Assembly should proceed without delay to perfect a partitioning plan. The full force of world opinion, British included, should be applied to the Arab leaders and people to bring them to agreement on this pacific settlement. Premature

0F RECORD OFFICE,

premature withdrawal by the present administrative agencies might precipitate such bloddy strife as has swept India since the end of British rule.

But the conditions in the two cases are not similar. Britain held no mandate in India. Her actions there were not under a deed of trust, as in Palestine. In the Holy Land she was charged to administer the government by the League of Nations under a pledge to make Palestine a Jewish homeland.

That pledge has never been fulfilled as originally intended. Jewish rights and immigration were restricted. The latter barrier has been responsible for the succession of tragic incidents afflicting thousands of Jews who have fled from Europe in attempting to reach that promised Homeland.

After this record it is more than disturbing to find the British Government serving what appears to be an ultimatum on the United Nations. British responsibility in Palestine has been built during a quarter of a century. This suggested withdrawal by Britain at a critical time may produce grave consequences.

Britain took on the job of administering the Palestine mandate 25 years ago. She wanted it. Her duty is as great as-even greater than-that of any other nation to find a just solution of the problems she herself helped to create. British knowledge of the conditions in Palestine is extensive and could be of immense value in an earnest attempt by the United Nations to work out a fair adjustment there. In fact, British administration in Palestine under a United Nations settlement, is needed. Certainly such administration would be vastly preferable to that of Russia or any of Russia's satellites.

Yesterday's flareup of violence in Tel Aviv only shows what fires are waiting to break into a deadly conflagration. The issues in Palestine call imperatively for settlement on an equitable partition basis. It should be made, as soon as possible by the United Nations, but with wholehearted British aid.



The problem of Palestine must be met, not abandoned. This is also a challenge to American leadership, which has been too cautious about the partition issue. Settlement involves duties, however difficult or disagreeable, which neither Britain nor America, nor any other nation in the United Nations, should shirk.

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I I

(Action completed)

| July | Index | I

9427

No. 750

(403/104/47)

HIS Majesty's Charge d'Affaires

presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned documents.

British EMBASSY MOSCOW

7th October

Reference to previous correspondence:

Mos cow telegram to Foreign Office No. 2217.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.

Subject.

"Pravda" - 6th October, 1947.

"Bankrupts" by D. Zaslavski.

Copies sent under P/L to :

UKDEL NEW YORK No. 14. U/n **JERUSALEM** WASHINGTON No. 148.



3479 11477 (2)

LON DON

6th October, 1947

By D. Zaslavski $\mathbb{C}\mathrm{R} I \mathrm{VD} I$.

Bankruotcy is an extremely common and wide spread phenomenom in the capitalist world. According to the general rule, the capitalist boss, manufacturer or banker, long conceals his poor state of financial affairs. The moment inevitably arrives, however, when it cannot be concealed. If the capitalist does not dispense a bullet into his head, he announces his insolvency. The Court decides the question of whether to consider his bankruptcy usual or fraudulent. A fraudulent bankruptcy involves a prison sentence. An unfraudulent one involves the loss of trust, credit on the Stock Exchange and in the banks.

This is the way the matter takes place in the private. ownership economic world. Sometimes the bankruptcy may be a misfortune it always involves shame and loss of one's good name".

Political bankpruptcy in the capitalist world has quite a

different appearance.

The British Government has announced its political incapacity in the Palestine question for all to hear. 30 years of domination in Palestine has led to complete collapse and final bankruptcy. Britain cannot and does not wish to pay the promissory notes given by the British Government to the League of Nations in 1920. It has been ampelled to renounce the mandate and is proposing that the United Nations should disentangle the mess of political intrigue and human blood, which is the result of the many years of British administration in Palestino.

The United Nations Organisation is essentially called upon to become a sort of court in the case of insolvent debtors. Tolitical and economic bankruptcy is in evidence. But in this case are we dealing with a "conscientious" or a fraudulent political bankruptcy? Were one to judge from the external appearance of the bankrupt, his face not only does not mirror signs of shame and disgrace, but on the contrary a certain sense of offence is registered: we, you see, were so concerned about the peoples of Palestine, and they have brought us, poor things, to political bankruptcy! And will not certain sympathetic states pity the manoeuvre of the Fonvizin Mitrofanushka Prostakov - Britain: Oh, how the British

Mama has worn herself out oppressing the Arabs and Jews!

We shall soon see just how the bankrupt politicians will place the blame on innocent heads. Meanwhile, let us dwell on the fact that the British Empire, which only recently was an extremely powerful state which had assembled under the power of several tens of millions of people, hundreds of millions of colonial slaves, has publicly and officially admitted its insolvency in the nationality question. Let us leave aside the sincerity of this confession. British troops have not yet been withdrawn from A palestine and it is not known whether they will be withdrawn. Having Vabandoned the position of supreme master, may yet agree to accept the role of a gendarme controlled by America in Palestine.

It is important for all those who are interested in the problems of nationality policy that Britain should have proclaimed her political bankruptcy in that policy. This is another transnormacollapse of the bourgeois nationality policy which is clearly confirming the correctness and profundity of the Louin-Stalin theory of the nationality question. Life is incontrovertibly confirming the scientific prediction. Yes, the nationality problem is insoluble on the lines of an imperialistic-colonial policy. The bourgeoisie can merely confuse this issue, turning it into a bloody mass of contradictions. Only the working class can solve the nationality problem, in those ways & by those means which have resulted in the friendship of peoples in the Soviet Union - by the complete liquidation of national and racial oppression, by the recognition not only on paper but in actuality of the complete equality of peoples, by the recognition of the right of every people to decide its own fate, either by separation as a state and the formation of an independent state, or by voluntar federative agreement With another people, another state.

OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,

Section A

PART I

6th October, 1947

TRAVDA (cont'd)

Johnson hastened to seize on to the proposal of Spaak. Herdeclared this proposal was acceptable to the American delegation. He at the same time proposed to hear the opinion of representatives of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania regarding this proposal. Johnson said: "The American delegation agrees to rectify its draft resolution in the direction indicated by the French delegation if the replies of Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria are satisfactory".

The Delegate from Colombia on cooperation among the Great Towers

The Colombian delegate, Lopez, recalled that when Churchill ordered British troops in Greece to renounce their neutrality and fire upon the people this had caused great discontent all over the World. Roosevelt had disapproved of that decision. The Colombian delegate went on to indicate that power politics have been used in Greece for a long time by certain powers. Greece had for many years been in the sphere of British influence. Said Lopez "It later became known that the USA was intending to take Britain's place in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea."

Having submitted a just illumination of the history

of the Greek question the Colombian delegate did not, however, find it possible to draw the logical conclusions. "Can the recognition of the guilt of one country or another facilitate the solution of the question" he asked. The Colombian delegate proposed "To give an opportunity to the Governments of Yugoslavia, Dulgaria, Albania and Greece, to make declarations of their good intentions".

Lopez stressed the need to consolidate cooperation among the great powers which is the basis of the UN. He indicated that a solution of the Greek question depended first of all on the achievement of mutual understanding among the great powers. He proposed "to ask the great powers directly interested in a solution of the Greek issue to discuss this question among themselves before the ending of the general debates, in an effort to determine the possibility of working out a general approach to its solution".

(3 columns) (Full translation)

DRAVDA 6.10.47

TRAVDA

ARRIVAL IN ISTANBUL OF NEW AMERICAN MISSION

ANKARA 5th October TASS The paper "Cumhuriet" reports

that an American Mission made up of 7 members of the Commerce Committee

of the House of Representatives has arrived at Istanbul and will discuss

problems of civil aviation and airfields. The paper points out that 12

million lire will be spent to expand an airfield in Eshilkei.

(10 lines)

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problems of civil aviation and airfields. The paper points out that 12

million lire will be spent to expand an airfield in Eshilkei.

THE WAR IN INDONESIA
THE HAGUE 5th October TASS Today's communiques from
Indonesia tell of continued Dutch offensive operations against the
Indonesians on many sectors of the front in Java and Sunatra.

(10 lines)

PRAVDA 6.10.47

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2 3 4 5 6 Reference: FO 371 6188

6th October, 1947

PRAVDA (contid)

their bankruptcy by the intractability of the Arabs and Jews, and their inability to get along with each other. It is they you please, and not the British imperialists who are responsible for the fact that a small and hitherto peaceful segment of the world has become a hornest nest. Perhaps somewhere in the American backwoods where it is not known what is meant by the modern nationality question, these lamentations may be successful. We in the Soviet land are too well acquainted with them, because of the not too-distant past.

and absorbed her, it appeared, forever, - in bourgeois Russia, Tsarist and Kerenski, bourgeois politicians were giving assurance that you could not leave Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijans face to face for a moment since they would inevitably out each other's and there would be national pogroms. Russia.

following one upon another, Conservative, Liberal, Labour - have followed one and the same traditional colonial-nationality policy. In the Soviet Union, one and the same unified Bolshevik Government applied a policy based on the Leninist-Stalinist theory of the nationality question. National hostility has not ceased for 30 years in Palestine, and at times has been aggravated to butchery and pogroms. For 30 years the brotherly Soviet Republics have been prospering peacefully in national agreement, in cooperation and friendship. The nonsensical nature of assertions of the inborn hatred of some nations for others, of the inability of some peoples to live in peace with others has been proved by experience. In every people not yet emerged from capitalist slavery there are classes which cannot live with other peoples without disagreements, without the exploitation and oppression of weaker people. And there are classes, workers and peasants, which can live and wish to live in national friendship with the workers of other peoples.

what is there to show for 30 years of British domination in Palestine? Constant deception of Arabs and Jews, false promises to both of them, the instigation of Jews against Trabs and Arabs against Jews; the deprivation of both peoples of any national independence. British politicians are now shedding crocodile tears: you see, they tried all means to get the Arabs and Jews to agree - they sat down cround a table, they put people in four-cornered prison recens, they hanged people, they flogged them....

one simple method alone has not been tried - n.t once have they left the population of Talestine in peace, not once have they given the workers of that country an opportunity to come together freely and agree on forms of co-habitation. For 30 years the British gendames brutally treated Talestine as a country of savages who allegedly were unable to take a single step indepotently. In three decades the wretched British guardians have brought the peaceful peoples to complete despair, have vexed them to folly... What is there that should cause surprise, then, in the fact that terror from all sides reigns in Palestine? There it is, is it not a subject for admiration - the bourgeois order in all its beauty, when country has become impassable, the conquerors, having frightened all the population, themselves live in constant fear.

OFFICE,

Section

TART I

6th October, 1947

(cont'd) PRYADY

Now the British politicians have magnaminously admitted their insolvency, their bankruptcy in policy. Yes, there must be a trial for such insolvency, they must be shamed publicly before all peoples! Why does a fraudulent bankrupt lose his credit on the British Stock Exchange, why will no one entrust his enterprise to him, but at a meeting of peoples the questi n should not be raised of whether bankrupt politicians can

claim further right to administrcolonies and peoples?

In 30 years who prevented the British rulers from making a peaceful and exemplary country with a prosperous culture out of Palestine? Terhaps it was the Communists or the Bolsheviks who got in the way? The fraudulent political bankrupts of all countries usually try to place the blame on them for their own crimes, for their own predatory policy. No, neither the Communists as a whole nor the Bolsheviks hindered the British Conservatives, Liberals and Labour Party followers in Palestine. In all their provocative policy in that country the British masters relied on the most Rightist groups among Arabs and among Jews, and only the most inveterate nationalists were their order boys. The entire British policy lay in fomenting national passions, in corrupting both peoples. The democratic elements suppressed and persecuted. In this respect the Labour Party followers are absolutely no different from the die-hard Conservatives. Lo, the results: there are Arabs who hate Jews, there are Jews who hate Arabs, and there are the tremendous majority of Arabs and Jews who could come to terms and speak a common language, but absolutely all Jews in Palestine and absolutely all the Arabs hate the British masters, and so great is this hatred that the masters have been struck dumb with terror and wish to come out vith a whole skin from the hell into which they have plunged a peaceful country. In order to go on "administering" Palestine in the same spirit of terror, Britain needs to send fresh troops, to inumdate all cities and hamlets with soldiers and police, to execute and hang thousands of people, to close Palestine tight . from cutside . scrutiny. The old pre-war Britain would not have halted at expense and would have turned streams of blood into rivers. But such an intense is too much for the pocket of present-day Britain. This colonial terror is why certain British politicians are prepared to exchange the role of independent master in palestine for the capacity of gendarme and hiroling hangman: you see, it's your dollars and our nooses. We'll strangle them together.


The British bankruptcy in Palestine is simply the most striking example of the general national-colonial bankruptcy of imperialism. Is it not this same thing which is going on in Indonesia, in Greece, in Southern Korea, everywhere where the bourgeois "order" is introduced to the

accompaniment artillery and machine gun fire?

And, parallel to these colonial-nationality paysages, is the growing friendship between the peoples in the countries of the new democracy where for centuries there was uninterrupted national enmity, kindled either by the Turkish pashas, or the Austrian gendarmes, or the German - fascist provocatours.

These are clear illustrations for the imperialistic doctrine of the national hostility of rival-peoples, and for the Bolshevik doctrine of the national friendship of working-peoples. Millions are now learning, the peoples of the entire world are learning, not from books alone, but, most of all, from examples out of life itself. (2 columns) (Full translation)

⊃RAVDA 6.10.47



British Legation,
BEIRUT.

34/296/47.

6th October, 1947.

Dear Department,

With reference to our telegram No. 700° of October 2nd concerning local reactions to the Colonial Secretary's statement on Palestine, we enclose a copy of an article in French by Michel Chiha (banker, newspaper owner and our local "Eminence Grise") which appeared in the newspaper "Le Jour" of Friday, October 3rd under the heading "Devant le Noeud Gordien".

Michel Chiha expressed similar views in conversation with a member of the Legation staff a few days prior to its publication. He added that he earnestly hoped that the British would not withdraw their influence from the Middle East, and that Britain would not go on accepting to be treated as World Power Number 3.

In case our Personality List has not yet been printed we attach for ease of reference an extract covering Michel Chiha.

Yours ever,

Chancery.

REGIONAL PROPERTY OF THE PROPE

Eastern Department, FOREIGN OFFICE.

TO 371 61881

35. - Michel Chiha. - A Roman Catholic banker of Beirut, born 1893. A member of the Board of Administration of the Banque de Syrie. Was a Deputy in 1926 at which time he assisted in the drafting of the Lebanese Constitution. A brother-in-law of the President and relative of Henri Pharaon; has long been power behind the Constitutional Party. Virtually directs the policy of Henri Pharaon and in major issues is always consulted by the President of whom however he has of late become critical. The local "Eminence grise". Formerly an advocate of a Christian Lebanon protected against Moslem domination is now in favour of the maintenance of the Lebanon as at present constituted as favouring the continued influence of his family and the exclusion of their rival Emile Eddé. He is owner of Le Jour (towhich he contributes a signed article daily) and, until it ceased publication of the "Eastern Times". A man of wide culture (Chiefly Latin) retiring and studious by nature and deeply religious, he is politically far-seeing though somewhat handicapped by his aloofness. A Jesuit in outlook. Though imbued with French culture and in favour of close relations (particularly economic) with France on the basis of independence, he is pro-British and has at intervals written stateman-like articles in his newspaper (e.g. in connexion with Anglo-Egyptian dispute). Anti-Zionist and anti-Communist. While disposed to cooperate with neighbouring Arab States on the basis of the Arab League, he is fundamentally suspicious of Moslem influence a sentiment which colours his whole political philosophy and his pro-British sympathies are tempered by some distrust of British pro-Moslem policy.

A shrewd and cautious financier; respected but not popular.

LON DON

Devant le noeud gordien.

L'Angleterre n'imposera pas, par ses seuls moyens une solution politique en Palestine "par la force des armes".

Si une solution devait etre imposée par la force "avec la participation d'autres pays", l'Angleterre resterait juge des formes et de l'étendue du recours à la force.

Ce langage raisonnable ne suffira pas à redresser une longue erreur.

Alors que, pendant vingt-cinq ans, c'est la force seule qui, en faveur du sionisme, a prévalu en Palestine, l'Angleterre ne veut plus aujourd'hui assumer toute seule la responsabilité de la force. Elle en a assez. Mais le mal est fait et nous voilà devant le noeud gordien. Y a-t-il apparemment un autre moyen que la force pour le trancher?

Il devient relativement aisé de définir la position actuelle de l'Angleterre. En depors d'un accord plus qu'improbable entre Arabes et Juifs, l'Angleterre ne pourrait théoriquement rester seule en Palestine qu'avec le statu quo or, le statu quo n'est évidemment qu'un aspect de la force; les choses étant ce qu'elles sont il semble donc qu'il faille aussi l'exclure.

Bientot il deviendra tout à fait clair qu'après s'etre intéressés puissamment, mais de loin, à la Palestine, il faudra que les Etats-Unis s'y intéressent de plus près, il ne suffit pas en effet de vouloir une solution, il faut la rendre possible.

Pour les Etats-Unis l'heure des responsabilités en Palestine va sonner. Et ce n'est que justice de le leur rappeler. Si les Etats-Unis ne sont pas prets à décider sur les lieux de la revendication des Juifs et du droit des Arabes il faut qu'ils cessent de se meler de l'aventure et de peser dans la balance. L'élémentaire raison veulent cela.

Et les Anglais, de leur coté, seraient tout à fait fous de se laisser acculer à devenir définitivement ce que les circonstances et leur complaisance envers les Juiss ont fait d'eux; des martyrs sans la foi.

Un proverbe de chez nous dit que "la guerre avec les longues-vues est facile". Que les Américains viennent donc en Palestine vérifier la chose et s'exercer à refouler les Arabes autrement que par des discours, pour mettre à leur place des Juifs! L'avenir jugera comme elle le mérite cette téméraire entreprise.

FC 371 61881

THE PUBLIC

RECORD

OFFICE,

LON DON

32003 F.O.P.

Should be

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

E 9.33

Sir A. Kirkbride No. 301 10th October, 1947

D. 1.25 p.m. 10th October 1947 R. 1.40 p.m. 10th October 1947

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York,
Bagdad, Damascus, Beirut (please pass to
Damascus as my telegram No. 76), Cairo,
Jedda, B.M.E.O. Cairo and Saving to Jerusalem.

IMMEDIATE SECRET

As Arab politicians and leaders become convinced that His Majesty's Government really mean their announcement on the subject of evacuation of Palestine new fears, suspicions and plans are making their appearance.

2. I have sensed a belief that the new British scheme is to withdraw British troops from Palestine but to leave Arab Legion and Transjordan Frontier Force behind with the role of containing Jews who would be permitted to seize power in the areas where they form a majority and of ensuring that Arab areas of Palestine are inherited by Transjordan, the member of the Arab League over which Great Britain exercises greatest influence.

The enquiries which are referred to in third paragraph of Beirut telegram No. 712 appear to me to constitute an interesting confirmation of this line of thought.

3. According to certain local sources of information anti-Hasimite parties are actively recruiting armed bands in Syria and the Lebanon with an idea of intervening in Palestine when evacuation begins in the name of the Arab Higher Committee, i.e. the Mufti. Sudden appearance of the Mufti in the Lebanon would fit in with such a scheme.

It is interesting in this connexion also that King Abdullah complained to me yesterday the Arab Higher Executive were engaged actively in endeavouring to seduce members of the Arab Legion and Transjordan Frontier Force from their respective allegiances with a view to using them in their commandes when fighting in Palestine broke out.

Fereign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda, B.M.E.O. as my telegrams Nes. 352, 87, 51 and 40 respectively.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Bagdad, Caire, Jedda and B.M.E.O. Caire]

747 OCT 30

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32003 F.O.P.

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Cypher.

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

66

FROM BETRUT TO JERUSALEM

Mr. Evans No. 90. October 6th, 1947. R. October 6th,

5. 9.3

11 OCT

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 64 Saving,

Cairo Embassy No. 59 Saving.
Cairo B. M. E. O. No. 44 Saving.
Bagdad No. 74 Saving.
Damascus No. 218 Saving.
Jedda No. 79 Saving.
Amman No. 77 Saving.

IMPORTANT.

RESTRICTED.

Palestine.

Lebanese Prime Minister sent for me this morning and asked whether he could be informed of the tenour of your statement to Arab and Jewish leaders or better still be furnished with the text thereof. He said that according to the delegate of the Palestine Arabs to the Arab League Council, your statement went further than the Colonial Secretary's speech and that the Arab and Jewish leaders were informed of decision by His Majesty's Government to withdraw from Palestine unconditionally i.e. whether there is a settlement or not. Arab Delegate was I ascertained not (repeat not) present at your meeting. Riad Bey added that it was important that on the eve of the meeting of the Arab League Council the Arabs should know exactly what the position was.

2. I hope you will be able to furnish me by telegram with material to enable me to reply to the Lebanese Prime Minister.


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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: FO 371 61881

10P SECRET & PER SNAL



JERUSALEM.

7th October 1947.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

Foreign Office, LONDON, S.W.1.

Reference telegram No. 90 dated 6th October 1947 from Charge d'Affaires, Beirut, to High Commissioner for Palestine. Attached for information are full notes of interviews between His Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine, Dr. Khalidi and Mr. Ben Gurion held on the 2nd October 1947.

Rinfanle Private Secretary. Reference:-

C

NOTES ON INTERVIEWS WITH DR. KHALIDI AND MR. BEN GURION 2ND OCTOBER 1947.

To both I said that I thought it was incumbent on me after my return from England, where I had been in close touch with the situation, to impress upon them the statement recently made by the Secretary of State at UNO meant exactly what it said. Great Britain is sick and tired of trying to get agreement between Arabs and Jews and is no longer in any mood to get mixed up in disturbances between them. She is most desirous of leaving Palestine with a happy solution and in peace but she is determined if Arabs and Jews do not agree to leave without that condition.

To Dr. Khalidi I said that I understood he had remarked to the Chief Secretary that they had heard all this from Great Britain before I pointed out that they had not heard this proposition before but what they had heard was that Britain was prepared to leave after having arranged independence for Palestine. Their present intention was something quite new. I suggested to them that they should take note of what was happening in India and although they had both made statements that they would be glad to see Great Britain go I wondered whether they had thought out to the full the possible implications and whether by their actions they wished to bring chaos and bloodshed on the ordinary inhabitants of the country who had benefited so greatly under the British during the past 25-years. It was my most earnest advice to them that it was their last chance of coming to an agreement and that they should strain every nerve to do so and before it is late to consider to the utmost what an unconditional withdrawal of the British would mean did they not do so.

Dr. Khalidi produced the usual Arab reply. The Jews had been invading Palestine over the past three decades, that the Arabs had seen this situation coming during the whole of that period, they had always wanted to come to an agreement with the Jews with whom individually they had no quarrel but the Jews by their aggressivess had always prevented agreement, their invasion and expansion was bound to ge on and therefore the Arabs had no alternative but to fight it out. They had in fact fully considered the matter and they felt there was no alternative. I merely said that I was sorry that he took this view but I hoped he would change it on more sober reflection having in view what I had already told him. I was not in the least surprised by Dr. Khalidi's attitude as I have always considered him quite unbalanced and nearly mad.

On the other hand Mr. Ben Gurion was much more susceptible. He asked me whether I felt there was the slightest chance of agreement, he said that it was a major point in their policy that they must find a way to get on with the Arabs and live in peace amongst them and that anything that could be done towards that end they must do. I told him that if they could assuage Arab fears regarding future Jewish expansion eastwards and the domination of the Arabs by the Jews that there was some slight chance that they might still get together. He said they were quite prepared to reassure the Arabs on these two points but they would have to make one reservation in that they would not discuss the stoppage of Jewish immigration. He said that he himself felt that the mass of the people in Palestine wished peace and that the fear of Arab disturbances was clearly exaggerated. I told him that although this might have been the case a short time ago the Arab situation had undoubtedly deteriorated and that if I were he I would not count too much on that theory and moreover all must realise that as long as we were being stabbed in the back by the Jews they could not expect us to give them full protection against the Arabs. We were not able to look both ways.

I then turned to the question of the provision to us of all the information at the disposal of the Hagana intelligence services. He attempted to say that it was a point of honour for individual Jews



not to give away their compatriots. I told him, although this was desirable in the interests of peace, that was not what I was asking for. I was aware that they had their own intelligence services which had a considerable amount of information and what I was asking was to make that available to us. If they really wanted to fight the terrorists, then by far their best course would be to let us know what they know. Mr. Ben Gurion then attempted tosay that when they had given information to the Police in the past there had been a disclosure of where it had come from. I told him that if they felt doubtful about giving information to the Police they could give it to anyone else they liked as long as they gave it. He made the remark that they had never found any difficulty in this respect with the Army. I therefore urged him to think the matter over and expressed a hope that they would co-operate in this way in future.

I then turned to the question of illegal immigration and told him that I considered it absolutely madness in their own interests that the Jews should go on with this policy at this time when the whole question of the future of Palestine was before UNO. I got the usual reply going back to the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration and saying that it was a matter of principle from which they could not depart. I continued to try and persuade him that they might not depart from their principle but they could at least arrest the movement of immigrants until the future was clear. In this however I made no headway whatever.

I also referred to his remark that all the people in the country wanted peace and asked him how he thought such incidents as the recent blowing up of an Arab house by the Hagana with consequent loss of life of Arab women and children was going to subscribe to that result. He appeared extremely uncomfortable at this question and said that those who were in charge had also been extremely perturbed by this affair.

I then started to close the interview but Mr. Ben Gurion himself returned to the first point he had made, namely that they must try and reach an agreement. He said that he quite appreciated that efforts in this direction were required and that anything I could do in the matter would be most helpful.

My general impression of the two interviews was that whatever the Jews are saying regarding looking after themselves they are in fact not at all happy at the idea of being left at the mercy of the Arabs and no doubt within the framework of partition are most anxious to come to some rapproachement as far as the Arabs are concerned. It is however quite clear that the present Arab Higher Committee are most unlikely to play.

One further point should be recorded. Mr. Ben Gurion rather shamefacedly asked me about the release of Ben Ami saying that he was being pressed on all sides for a release as a matter of policy. I asked him straight would be release him and his reply was "You have placed me on the spot".

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E 9442

1947

PALESTINE

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Registry Number E9442/951/31.

TELEGRAM FROM

No. 44 Bow Ker

Dated Cours

Received in Registry \ 4.00

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9443

32003 F.O.P.

En Clair

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

D. 7. 03 p.m. 9th October, 1947. Mr Bowker 9th October, 1947. R. 9. 07 p.m. 9th October, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem Beirut Damascus Saving Amman Saving Bagdad Saving Jedda Saving

Subject Palestine.

Moslem Brethren Society's newspaper of 8th October, reports Hassan Al Banna telegraphed Azzan in Beirut on occasion of Arab League Council's meeting, stating Moslem Brethren consider only way to save Palestine is by force and offering to place 10,000 young men at disposal of Arab League as first detachment which is prepared to move at first signal. Same newpaper urges Arab states to open voluntary recruitment offices to form military detachments and orges Arab Governments to prepare their armies to participate in a decisive campaign tockapel colonisers and Zionists from the Holy Land. 2 2 2 2

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(Frem United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2860

D. 6.16 p.m. 10th Poths 71947

10th October, 1947

R. 12.33 a.m. 11th October, 1947

Repeated Washington Saving Jerusalem

IMMEDIATE

My immediately fellowing telegram centains the text of the statement which the United States delegation intend to make in Palestine Committee on morning of October 11th. Statement is secret until delivered and time of delivery will depend on length of previous speeches.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 82.

[Copies sent to Colonial Office for retransmission to Jerusalem].

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Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evans. No. 728

D.10.12 a.m. 9th October; 1947 8th October, 1947. R. 3.42 p.m. 9th October, 1947

Repeated to Cairo; British Middle East Office Cairo; Jerusalem. Jerusalem.

Bagdad; Damascus; Jedda;)

Saving

SECRET

My telegram No.19 to Jerusalem (repeated to you No.64 Saving).

Palestine.

I was received by the Lebanese Prime Minister this afternoon and gave him the gist of what the High Commissioner for Palestine told Dr. Khalidi and Ben Gurion on the subject of the Colonial Secretary's statement. out in particular that His Excellency had stressed to both leaders the fact that this was their last chance of coming to terms.

- Riad Bey said he realised both the gravity of the situation and the import of the Colonial Secretary's speech. He proposed in fact to make the statement the basis of the Arab League's deliberations. He himself had no doubt it was a new development which called for new tactics on the part of the Arabs. He added that judging by such contacts as he had had with the Arab delegates the statement had created a favourable impression.
- I told Riad Bey that speaking personally it seemed to me that there were only two alternatives before the Arabs:
 - open conflict with the Jews or
 - some arrangement acceptable to both parties.

Riad Bey said he agreed and added that if a conflict occurred he had no doubt that in the first stages the Arabs would suffer severe losses though in the end he was confident they would win the day. As regards some arrangement acceptable to both parties he thought short of a miracle no agreement was possible. His personal view however was that the situation at the United Nations Assembly might develop somewhat on the

following lines. "No solution would be found acceptable to the Jews and Arabs. It would then be realised that if the British evacuate Palestine (as in that case they were bound to do in accordance with the Colonial Secretary's statement) no alternative forces would be available to put into effect any Idecision. In these circumstances it might well be decided to postpone the whole question for a year or so. Something like the status quo might then be inevitable and he personally thought this would suit the Arabs who might even be prepared to accept limited immigrants". Riad Bey said his instinct was that if the Palestine question could be postponed in this way His Majesty's Government would be in a position to press forward with solution of the "Egyptian" problem and, assured of Arab goodwill, to devote their energies to negotiations on the question of Sudan and Palestine.

Cairo pass to British Middle East Office as my telegram No. 170.

1947 **PALESTINE** en Palestine. Registry = 9445/951/31. Record of conversation with belowere TELEGRAM FROM No.H.M.a. poposals Dated10 Oct. Received in Registry 11 Oct. (Minutes.) Last Paper. Now fleane nee E. 9473/754/6-E9444. References. (Print.)(How disposed of.) he . hualtiesis (C.O) M.O. H M/39. Rotal W Yan 10496, 130 A. (Action completed.) Next Paper.

THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Evans,

D: 1.8 p.m. 10th October, 1947

No. 728 10th October, 1947

R: 2.49 p.m. 10th October, 1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Cairo, British Middle East Office, Bagdad, Amman,

Jedda, Jerusalem Damascus Saving.

IMPORTANT. SECRET.

E9484/951/31

My telegram No. 727; Arab League meeting; Palestine.

I saw Lebanese Prime Minister last night immediately after the meeting. He said that on the whole things had gone very smoothly and that various obstacles had been overcome without undue difficulty. Results were in general what he had anticipated. Firstly, secret Bludan decisions would not (repeat not) be efficially communicated to His Majesty's Government and United States Government. They still stood but reference to them in communiqué was in general terms. Secondly, Colonial Secretary's statement had been basis of Council's deliberations and general attitude of Gouncil as far as His Majesty's Government were concerned was favourable. Speaking for precautionary military measures he said that they were inevitable as it was essential that, if the British withdrew, the vacuum should be filled. As regards financial aid he said that this would now be open and abovebeard and that allocations to Palestine would appear spenly in budgets of various Arab States.

2. Riad Bey appeared to be more confident of the ability of the Arabs to stand up to the Jews than he was before the meeting. He will [sic] clearly pleased with results particularly with the part which he had played as Chairman.

Fereign Office please pass to United Hingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No. 27, and Caire" to British Middle East Office as my telegram No.175.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York].

6 Reference: FO 371 61881

9463

Next Paper

E ...

The Meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League to discuss the U.H.S.C.O.P. Report.

The meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League began at Beirut on the 16th September. Its purpose was to discuss the U.N.S.C.O.P. Report and to consider the attitude to be adopted by the Arab League. The meeting was originally summoned by the Iraqi Prime Minister, who told H.M. Charge d'Affaires that he hoped that decisions taken there would open the Flag A eyes of the U.S. and the British Governments to the consequences of supporting any Palestine policy unacceptable to the Arabs. He expected the Committee to inform both Governments that, if Arab views were ignored, there would be serious trouble, both political and economic, between the Arab world and Great Britain and the United States. He hoped, however, to avoid any publicity. Samir Pasha (Prime Minister of Transjordan), with whom the Iraqi Prime Minister discussed these proposals, gave a rather different Flag B account of them. According to him, Salehabr (Iraq) did not expect the Committee to accept his proposal that members of the Arab League should apply economic sanctions against Great Britain and the United States, if the U.N.S.C.O.P recommendations were implemented. Iraq would then withdraw from the League, together with Transjordan, thus gaining credit for their readiness to make sacrifices for the Arab cause (but without actually having to make them) and also escaping from the Egyptian dominated League at a favourable moment and on the best possible issue. Samir Pasha said he agreed with this view and told H.M. Minister that he would support Iraq at the meeting. Later, however, he told Brigadier Clayton that Iraq did not really intend to leave the Flag C League and that Transjordan would certainly not do so. It seems possible that Samir Pasha's original statement was representative based on of the arguments he had employed with King Abdullah who was in

favour of leaving the League but not of a policy of hostility to E8746 Great Britain. Flag D

Brigadier Clayton was instructed to go to Beirut and to find out exactly what was happening. He was then to take whatever action seemed most appropriate in order to discourage the Iraqi and Transjordan Prime Ministers from making their dangerous proposals E 8589 H.M. Charge d'Affaires at Beirut found Saleh Jabr impervious to Flag &F argument, though Samir Pasha was hesitant and seemed doubtful of the wisdom of the Iraqi attitude.

During the meeting itself there appear to have been considerable differences of opinion between the various delegates, notably between those of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Saleh abr pressed for Flag #6 the adoption of economic sanctions, whilst Youssef Yasin (Saudi Arabia) shrank from such measures. Samir Pasha endeavoured to steer a middle course, in spite of his previous agreement with Fkag H Saleh Jabr, while the representatives of Egypt, Syria, the Lebanon and the Yeman though afraid of public opinion in their own countries, generally supported saudi Arabia. Saleh John

The/

which might have un forseable Correquences

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E8750 Flag J The meeting ended on the 19th when a communique was issued stating that the Committee had decided that U.N.S.C.O.P's proposals involved a flagrant sacrifice of the natural rights of the Arabs of Palestine to independence, and that the Arab States were determined to resist the implementation of these proposals by all practical and effective means. They would indeed be unable to repress the sentiments of their own peoples. They, therefore, offered the Arabs of Palestine all the assistance and sacrifices within their power. The communique ended with a conventional expression of support for Egypt.

E8758 Flag K According to Samir Pasha the Committee decided:

- (a) To reject the U.N.S.C.O.P. recommendations.
- (b) To give effective assistance to the Palestine Arabs if these recommendations were implemented.
- (c) To instruct their delegates at Lake Success to develop all possible diplomatic contacts to further the Arab case.
- (d) To discourage notes to H.M.G. and the U.S. Government. (H.M. Chargé d'Affaires at Damascus received a note, based largely on the communiqué, on the 22nd September and others will doubtless follow).

E8793 Flag L

(e) The Council of the Arab League would meet on October 2nd to consider implementing the "Bludan" decisions. (See below). The the of the meeting was rejumbly the 6th, but was but formed to the 2nd.

EST94 FLAG M

(f) To pass a resolution in support of Egypt.

The most significant result of this meeting was their decision, ostensibly on juridicial grounds, to refer to the Council of the Arab League the question of implementing the "Bludan" decisions. We do not possess the actual text of these decisions but, according to Samir Pasha, they were five in number, as follows:

- E8744 . flag 6 (a) No new economic concessions would be granted to the E8745 flag H Anglo-Saxons.
 - (b) There would be a moral boycott of the Anglo-Saxons.
 - (c) The Arabs would consider the withdrawal of existing concessions.
 - (d) The Arabs would refer the Palestine decision to the United Nations.
 - (e) The Arabs would not co-operate with the Anglo-Saxons in any international bodies.

These Bludan deisions were originally adopted in May 1946 and were to be implemented in the went of the recommendations of the anglo. American Committee beinghos with effect.

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FLAG C

Iraq appears to be the only member whole-heartedly in favour of economic sanctions (the only important part of these decisions) and it seems doubtful whether she would put them into effect unless Saudi Arabia did the same. Brigadier Clayton suggested that it might be worth while to approach King Ibn Saud to withhold his agreement. By the time of the Council's meeting on October 2nd, however, H.M.G's declaration of their policy on Palestine will have been made and the situation will thus have altered. It would appear preferable, therefore, to take no further action until we have had time to judge Arab reactions to this declaration of policy.

T.E. CABLE)

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(coty atto) giving the text of the devisions of the Seint (sofar) meeting. (4) is the most significant. I agree that no further action is required at present. Our statement in the security (the will considerably modify the situation.

Manles. Moor useful. 25.9 Let us cousider on Sepr. 29th Chellier any achier is required before the west of the Arab Jeanne in the light of Arab reactions to make the Statement COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

2 3 4 5 6 Reference:1 2 2 3 4 5 6 Reference:-

Arab Reaction to the Announcement of H.M.G.'s Policy on Palestine.

Arab reaction to Mr. Creech Jones' declaration to the United Nations Assembly at New York may be summarised as follows:-

The Arab Delegation to the United Official Reactions Nations welcomed what it called a "belated declaration" and expressed the hope that H.M.G.'s decision would not later be reversed under Zionist pressure. With this one exception, there has been no public comment from official Arab sources, and this will probably be deferred until the meeting of the Council of the Arab League on the 7th October. official circles have expressed scepticism regarding the sincerity of the declaration, but in Baghdad their reaction was one of sober satisfaction, while the Lebanese Prime Minister warmly welcomed the declaration and congratulated H.M.G. on their decision. He regarded it as favourable to the Arabs and thought the situation in Palestine after the British withdrawal might develop in one of two ways. Either the Jews might abandon their intransigence and accept a compromise on the basis of the status quo with limited immigration or, and this he considered more likely, a serious clash would develop as in India. No official reactions have been reported from the Transjordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia or the Yemen.

Press Comment. Press comment has been restricted by the distractions of internal politics and the Egyptian cholera epidemic and has, on the whole, been less favourable, varying from the disbelief to restrained welcome for a "good beginning". Only two newspapers applauded the declaration as doing justice to Arab aspirations, while several described it as a feint designed to force the United States to share

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Britain's burden in Palestine. Most newspapers express doubt of the sincerity of Britain's intentions and an Arab-Jewish conflict was generally envisaged as the consequence of British withdrawal. The Egyptian press, in particular, was uniformly hostile.

In Iraq the declaration has relieved Other Reactions. the tension and a general strike which the local political parties have called for/appears to be an empty gesture, since the date fixed is a holiday. In Jedda, where there are no newspapers, bazaar opinion was appreciative of H.H.G.'s desire to avoid conflict with the Arabs but apprehensive of an Arab struggle in which the Jews would receive United States support and might thus prove the stronger. In the Lebanon, the declaration was favourably received by Moslem notables, though with some doubt of its sincerity and some apprehension of the possible repercussions of a hasty British withdrawel. Lebanese Christians were alarmed at the prospect that an era of bloodshed in the Arab world might follow the British evacuation and even their moderate elements were anxious that withdrawal should not be unduly hurried.

The most general trend of Arab opinion seems to be that U.M.G.'s statement is only a beginning and that judgement must be reserved until its results, if any, can be seen.

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RECORD OFFICE,

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Under-Secretary of States, J. Commonweak

Relations. 1 8 OUT 1947

This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher (typex) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.

<u>OUTWARD TELEGRAM</u>

CYPHER (TYPEX)

0.D.

FROM:

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

CANADA AUSTRALIA (GOVT.)

NEW ZEALAND

SOUTH AFRICA

(Sont 8.25 p.m. 16th Oct., 1947)

D. No. 325 SECRET

My telegram 20th September D. No. 778.

PALESTINE.

Immediate reaction in Arab States to Colonial Secretary's statement, particularly in press, was one of scepticism: line was taken that warning of United Kingdom withdrawal might be political feint, later interpretation of which would show whether only United Kingdom interests were being served. His Majesty's Representatives in the various Arab States were instructed therefore to make it clear to Governments to which they were accredited that Colonial Secretary's statement meant exactly what it said. Arab Governments now appear to realize its significance and are showing a sober satisfaction at knowledge that we shall not (repeat not) implement a solution unacceptable to Arabs, tempered with alarm at possible consequences of our withdrawal.

- This state of mind is reflected in communique of 9th October issued after meeting at Beirut of Arab League Council at which resolutions were approved recommending that Governments of Arab States should (a) take military precautions on Palestine frontiers;
- (b) provide funds to give effective help to Arabs in Palestine;
- (c) in face of threat of Zionist forces and their terrorist organisations, consider measures to protect interests of Palestine Arabs after United Kingdom withdrawal. Text of resolutions as given.

in/

in communique follows by Savingram.

3. Uncomfirmed reports indicate that Syrian and Egyptian forces have moved up to Palestine frontier. His Majesty's United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires, Damascus, accordingly reminded Acting Prime Minister that, until United Kingdom troops and administration were withdrawn from Palestine, His Majesty's Government in United Kingdom remained responsible for administration, defence and security of Palestine. Mr. Dundas added that, in his opinion, sending of Syrian troops to neighbourhood of frontier was provocative and would probably result in a deterioration of internal situation of Palestine.

quarters whether, in view of Arab League threat to use their forces in Palestine, we intended to cease supplies of arms to Arab Governments Arms and equipment have been provided for Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan in normal discharge of our treaty obligations. We have also been prepared to sell to Syria up to minimum amount required for purposes of internal security. Our view is that States concerned have right to maintain limited forces for defence and internal security and that they have not (repeat not) built up their forces with express purpose of intervening in Palestine. We still hope for peaceful settlement, but in event of conflict between Jows and Arabs it would no doubt be open to United Nations to make recommendations about stopping supply of arms to this area. Until then we regard any suggestions that we should take unilateral action as premature and hypothetical.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

Mr. F.T.A. Ashton-Gwatkin Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)

Mr. I.P. Garran Mr. K. Barnes

C.R.O. (King Charles St.)

THE PUBLIC

RECORD OFFICE,

LON DON

With the Compliments of the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth 18 007 1947

Relations.

(BY AIR MAIL)

0.D.

FROM:

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

(GOVI. SOUTH AFRICA

(Sent 16th Oct., 1947)

D. No. 523 SAVING

PALESTINE: ARAB LEAGUE COUNCILS RESOLUTIONS.

Following is text of resolutions on Palestine as given in communique issued by Arab League Council of 9th October.

- The Council consider that the Bludan secret decisions, which were to be executed in the event of the report of the United Kingdom -United States Committee of Enquiry being accepted and a plan devised for their execution are still valid and should be executed if any solution affecting the rights of Palestine to be an independent Arab State is applied.
- As regards the decision of the United Kingdom Government recently announced to abandon the Mandate over Palestine and to withdraw their troops and administration, and in view of the presence of the Zionist forces and terrorist organisations which threaten the safety of the Arabs of Palestine, the Council consider that the Arab States should take military precentions on the Palestine frontiers. Therefore, the Council suggest that it should be recommended to the Governments of the Arab States that they should proceed to take these military precautions and at the same time that States limitrophe to Palestine should facilitate the participation and co-operation of non-limitrophe States.
- As regards the execution of the previous decisions to give effective help to the Arabs of Palestine, the Council recommend to the /

the Governments of the States members of the League that they should begin giving material and moral help to the Arabs of Palestine, in order to strengthen and encourage them in defending themselves and their existence. The Council also recommend to the States of the League that they should produce immediately the necessary funds for this purpose and that these funds should be spent under the supervision of a special committee. Ends.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

Mr. F.T.A. Ashton-Gwatkin

Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)

C. R.O. (King. Charles St.)

Mr. I.P. Garran Mr. K. Barnes

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TELEGRAM FROM DOMINIONS OFFICE

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CYPHER (TYPEX)

9462 951 P/. 0.D

TO:

CANADA AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND SOUTH AFRICA (GOVT.)

1 t 1 t

(Sent 9.05 p.m. 24th Oct., 1947.)

D. No. 843 SECRET.

PALESTINE.

Following is our interim appreciation of way Palestine situation as a whole is developing.

- 2. We are in general fairly satisfied with effect of our undertaking, to withdraw, which has brought Arabs and Jews and other Governments nearer to facing realities.
- It is fairly clear that United States Government are unwilling to incur more than a limited share of responsibility for garrisoning or administration of Palestine, and best result from our point of view would be that Arabs and Jews should agree and should ask us to remain in Palestine for a limited transitional period to help them put agreement into effect. United States and Soviet support for partition makes it less likely that Jews will make any concessions. Jewish Agency, however, do not (repeat not) seem to be at all optimistic that, should a plan of partition be recommended by Assembly, an effective instrument of enforcement will be agreed upon and brought into being by United Nations in time to replace our administration. On Arab side, we are inclined to think that there may be tendency towards compromise, as illustrated by speech of Pakistan Delegate to United Nations on 13th October, who, while reiterating his opposition to partition, said that if this solution were recommended boundaries should be so drawn as to include roughly the same number of Arabs in Jewish state as Jews in Arab state. In adherence to terms under which we referred Palestine question to United Nations we have assumed in discussions a somewhat passive/



passive role and shall be careful not (repeat not) to become prematurely associated with any specific compromise proposal.

-2-

4. Our view of threats of direct action by Arab states is that they should be treated with caution. We have, however, authorised our representatives in Arab states to remind Governments to which they are accredited of our interim responsibility for administration of Palestine in terms similar to representations already made to Syrian Government (my telegram 16th October D. No. 829 paragraph 3), and to deny rumours that we have any secret arrangements with any Arab Government about action by Arab forces in Palestine after our withdrawal.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

Mr. F.T.A. Ashton-Gwatkin

Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)

Mr. J.E. Cable

THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,

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Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office 4 NOV 1947-

(This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher (typex) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.)

CYPHER (TYPEX)

0.D.

TO:

CANADA. AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND SOUTH AFRICA

(Sent 8.30 p.m. lst Nov., 1947.)

D. No. 853 SECRET.

My telegram 24th October D. No. 843.

PALESTINE: SOVIET POLICY.

Following is our provisional appreciation of motives for Soviet support of UNSCOP's majority proposal for partition.

- We do not (repeat not) view this support as evidence of new Soviet attitude of objectivity and co-operation. Support for independence of national minorities is basic Soviet doctrinal principle, which may be turned to advantage in case of Jews in Palestine as precedent for support of claims of Kurds and Armenians.
- Primary aim of Soviet Government is probably to debar United Kingdom and United States Governments from maintaining their strategic position in Eastern Mediterranean . Best method of achieving this no doubt seems to them to lie in encouraging partition, since thereafter either party is likely to oppose establishment of bases in territory of the other. Soviet Government may well also take view that implementation of majority plan would cause trouble in Middle East, thus adding to difficulties of United Kingdom and United States Governments.
- Establishment of Communist state in Palestine or at least in Jewish areas, may possibly be ultimate Soviet object. State would be organised by Communist-indoctrinated illegal immigrants from Eastern Europe (my telegram 23rd October D. No. 532 Saying, paragraph 2). Emphasis in Soviet statement on economic unity of Palestine is perhaps intended to facilitate extension of Communist influence from Jewish

to Arab Palestine and thence throughout Arab Middle East. However, His Hajesty's United Kingdom Ambassador, Hoscow, has pointed out that it is doubtful whether hope of introducing Communism through Jewish immigrants bulks very largely with Soviet Government who are well aware of extent to which Zionism is connected with United States big business and of fact that a Jewish state extending over all or part of Palestine would be dependent on United States for a long time to come.

- As regards implementation and transitional period, Soviet statement was vague. It might suit them an general grounds that we should be responsible for implementing an unpopular settlement.
- Soviet Government have not (repeat not), in our opinion, maintained a consistent view of Talestine problem. Now that need to take a definite stand has become more urgent, their tendency is to hedge. Their hint of need for revised frontiers is probably intended to secure ground for manocuvre up to last moment.

Copy to:-Foreign Office

F.T.A. Ashton-Gwatkin

Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)

Mr. J.G.S. Beith

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM FROM DOMINE NS OFFICE

This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher (types) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.

F 2701/50 CYPHER (TYPEX)

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CINIDI $\underline{\mathrm{TO}}$:

LUSTICILL MEW ZELLIND SCUTH AFRICA

(Sent 1.35.p.m. 7th November, 1947)

IMPORTINT

D No.862 SHCRET

My telegram 3rd November D No.054. Palestine.

We have been further considering U.S. proposal and we see strong objection to it on following grounds :-

- (a) it would commit us to a lateline based on considerations other than withdrawal of our troops and administration in the shortest possible time;
- (h) it would commit us to remain in Indestine until 1st July, 1948, oven should an earlier withdrawal prove practicable;
- (c) unless U.N. decision were based on an agreed settlement, proposal would inevitably involve us in enforcement of partition and would wreck our withdrawal programme.
- U.S. proposal is therefore unacceptable to us and U.K. Lelegation in New York have been asked to make this clear. Copy to:

Foreign Office - Mr I... Kirkpatrick Mr. J.F.C. Finch (4) Mr. J.G.S. Deith

RECORD OFFICE,

13 OCT

1947

PALESTINE

Registry 12-9463 951 31. FROM F.O muule No.

Dated Received in Registry (500). The Anal League and Palistine

Last Paper

9462

References

(Minutes.)

Pleuse see E 9219

(Print)

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(Action completed) Next Paper

9477

E 3.63

THE ARAB LEAGUE AND PALESTINE

Please see Sir O. Sargent's minute on the attached copy of Beirut telegram No. 710.

The Bludan decisions, recommending a degree of economic sanctions and "moral boycott" of H.M. Government and the United States Government were originally adopted in May 1946 for implementation in the event of the adoption of the recommendations of the Anglo-American committee on Palestine.

At the recent meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Arab League countries at Sofar in the Lebanon, to discuss the U.N.S.C.O.P. recommendations, the Iraqi Prime Minister came forward with a proposal to bring up to date and strengthen these Bludan decisions for application against Great Britain and the United States in the event of our supporting any Palestine policy in the United Nations unacceptable to the Arabs. This proposal is to be considered at the meeting of the Arab League which begins on 7th October.

The proceedings at the Sofar meeting, and unsuccessful attempts to discourage Saleh Jabr from pressing this wild proposal, and the details of the original Bludan decisions are given in the attached minute by Mr. Cable (Flag N). No suggestion has been made by Eastern Department that a further attempt should be made to influence the Arab Governments before the Arab League meeting, and it was expected that the Colonial Secretary's speech at the United Nations would alter the situation and convince the Arab Governments of our sincerity.

I submit draft reply to Beirut.

A general summary of And reactions to our statement is also attacked - Plag P.

6th October, 1947

The off. Cel. to Beirut is on the right him Ituna tond, be got off as som as possible as the Arab League meeting begins tomorror.

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

CYPHER OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evans.

D: 5.13 p.m.4th October, 1947.

No. 710. 4th October, 1947.

R: 8.20 p.m.4th October, 1947.

Repeated to: Amman,

B.M.E.O. Cairo,

Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda,

Damascus,)Saving. Jerusalem.

IMPORTANT SECRET

Palestine.

Sheik Youssef Yasin called on me this morning in connexion with the forthcoming meeting of the Arab League Council. He said that Samir Pasha Rifai had informed Riad Bey Solh that "the situation had changed" and that he wondered whether this meant that the Iraqi and Transjordan attitude on the question on Bludan decisions and proposed economic boycott of Britain and America had been modified. No doubt Colonial Secretary's statement (of which he clearly approved) had had its effect but it also occurred to him that "conversations" with the British had taken place in Bagdad and Amman. It was inconceivable he said that the Iraqis could have taken such a stand on the question of a boycott without British support; if His Majesty's Government "shut their eyes for five minutes" the present Iraqi Government would be swept away. Briefly what he wished to know was what was the attitude of His Majesty's Government so that the policy of King Ibn Saud, whose wish was always to work in harmony with His Majesty's Government, could be shaped accordingly.

I should be glad to receive your instructions as to what reply I should give to Sheik Youssef, if possible before the opening of the meeting of the Arab League Council on October 7th.

Cairo please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No. 162.

32008 F.O.P.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2861

D. 9.55 p.m. 10th October, 1947

10th October, 1947
Repeated to Jerusalem,
Repeated to Jerusalem,
Repeated to Jerusalem,

Washington Saving,

IMMEDIATE GIANT My immediately preceding telegram.

[Begins]

confronts the General Assembly of the United Nations with a heavy and complex responsibility. The General Assembly, having assumed responsibility for making recommendations to the United Kingdom on the subject, must do everything within its power to evolve a practical solution consistent with the principles laid down in the United Nations charter.

- of the problem is so great that the General Assembly must recommend a solution at this session. The degree of urgency has been brought to our attention by continued violence in Palestine, by the context of the Special Committee's report, and by the statement of the delegate from the United Kingdom, regarding the recommendations of the committee and future British responsibilities in Palestine.
- benefit of the views of several members of this committee, and has heard statements by the representatives of the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine on behalf of the peoples primarily concerned. The United States delegation believes that this discussion has been of material assistance and hopes that it will continue on the broadest basis.
- World War a large area of the Near East, including Palestine, was liberated and a number of States gained their independence. The United States having contributed its blood and resources to the winning of that war, felt that it could not divest itself of a certain responsibility for the manner in Which the freed territories were disposed of, or for the fate of the peoples liberated at that time. It took the position that these peoples should be prepared for Self-Government and also that a National Home for the Jews should be established in Palestine. The United States Government has subsequently had long and friendly relations with the independent States which were created in the Near East and is

371/61881

happy

happy to note that most of them are members of the United Nations and have representatives present at this meeting.

5. It may be recalled with regard to Palestine, that in 1917 the Government of the United Kingdom in the statement known as the Balfour Declarations, announced that it viewed with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people and that it would use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of that object, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. In 1923 the objectives stated in this declaration were embodied in the League of Nations mandate for Palestine which was entrusted to the Government of the United Kingdom as mandatory. As the United States was not a member of the League of Nations a convention was concluded between the United States and the United Kingdom in 1924 with regard to American rights in Palestine. The Palestine mandate is embedied in the preamble to this convention. The United States consented to this mandate. Members of this Committee are aware of the situation which subsequently developed in Palestine and of the many efforts which have been made to achieve a settlement. We now have before us a report of the Special Committee of the United Nations with regard to the Palestine question.

6. The United States delegation supports the basic principles of the unanimous recommendations and the majority plan which provides for partition and immigration. It is of the opinion, however that certain amendments and modifications would have to be made in the majority plan in order more accurately to give effect to the principles on which that plan is based. My delegation believes that certain geographical modifications must be made. For example, Jaffa should be included in the Arab State because it is predominantly an Arab city. My delegation suggests that the General Assembly may wish to provide that all the inhabitants of Palestine, regardless of citizenship or place of residence, be guaranteed access to ports and to water and power facilities on a non-discriminatory basis; that constitutional guarantees, including guarantees regarding equal economic opportunity, be provided for Arabs and Jews alike, and that the powers of the Joint Economic Board, be strengthened. Any solution which this Committee recommends should not only be just, but also workable and of a nature to command the approval of world opinion.

7. The United States delegation desires to make certain observations on the carrying out of such recommendations as the General Assembly may make regarding the future Government of Palestine. The General Assembly did not, by admitting this item to its agenda, undertake to assume responsibility for the administration of Palestine during the process of transition to independence. Responsibility for the Government of Palestine now rests with the mandatory power. The General Assembly, however, would not fully discharge its obligations if it did not take carefully into account the

problem of implementation.

8. Both the majority report and the statement of the United Kingdom representative in this Committee raise the problem of carrying into effect the recommendations of the General Assembly. We note for example that the majority report indicates several points at which the majority thought the United Nations could be of assistance. It was suggested that the General Assembly approve certain steps involved in the transitional period, that the United Nations guarantee certain aspects of the settlement concerning Hely Places and minority rights, that the Economic and Social Council appoint three members of the Joint Economic Board, and that the United Nations accept responsibility as administering authority of the City of Jerusalem under an international trusteeship.

United Nations programme to assist the parties involved in the establishment of a workable political settlement in Palestine. We refer to assistance through the United Nations in meeting economic and financial problems and the problem of internal law and order during the transition period. The latter problem might require the establishment of a special constabulary or police force recruited on a volunteer basis by the United Nations. We do not refer to the possibility of violations by any member in its obligations to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force. We assume that there will be charter observance.

solution work rests with the people of Palestine. If new political institutions are to endure, they must provide for early assumption by the people themselves of the responsibility for their own domestic order. Acts of violence against constituted authority and against rival elements of the local population have appeared in Palestine over a period of many years and have greatly increased the difficulties of finding a workable solution to this complex problem. Certain elements have resorted to force and terror to obtain their own particular aims. Obviously this violence must cease if independence is to be more than an empty phrase in the Hely Land.

is to take the next step in dealing with this question. If the Committee favours the principles of the majority plan, we should establish a Sub-Committee to work out the details of a programme which we could recommend to the General Assembly.

will represent the collective opinion of the world. The problem has thus far defied solution because the parties primarily at interest have been unable to reach a basis of agreement. This is a problem in the solution of which world opinion can be most helpful.


Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 83.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem].

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

Ne. 3460

D. 7.53 p.m. 13th October 1947

13th October 1947
Repeated to Washington No. 10512
MOST IMMEDIATE
GIANT

Your telegram No. 2861 [of October 10th: Palestine]. Following for Colonial Secretary.

I am anxious that you should, before the general discussion closes answer implications in paragraph 7 of United States statement.

Urgent instructions are being drafted and will, if possible, be despatched before noon on October 14th. Please endeavour to ensure that general discussion is kept open until they are received.

CCC

En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2876

D. 1.10 alm. 11th October, 1947

10th October, 1947.

R. 7.10 a.m. 11th October, 1947

Repeated Jerusalem Immediate
Washington Immediate Saving

IMMEDIATE GIANT E 9.80

My telegram No. 2844.

Palestine Committee.

On the 10th October Granades (Guatemala) equalled the previous record of the delegate for Pakistan by speaking throughout the tenth meeting. He announced that his Government accepted the majority proposal which he had signed as a member of U.N.S.C.O.P. He then outlined the career of Haj Amin El Husseini criticising the mandatory government for the liberty permitted him before 1957 and asked what would be the fate of a Jewish minerity in a state under his control.

- 2. Granades declared that since 1939 His Majesty's Gevernment's pelicy in Palestine had not been in conformity with the mandate. He had signed the U.N.S.C.O.P. majerity recommendation for British administration during the transition period, out of deference to his colleagues and for the sake of unanimity. But the Colonial Secretary's statement had now altered the situation. He therefore proposed an amendment to the majerity plan providing that
- (1) either of the proposed states might request its independence before the 1st September 1949
- (II) the mandatery power should meanwhile be replaced by the United Nations acting through three delegates elected by the General Assembly from nationals of member states other than the Big Five
- of military centingents from the member states other than the Big Five, in properties to the total numbers of their armed forces. The contingents should be composed as far as possible of volunteers drawn from regular forces.
- be described by the three administering delegates

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: FO 371 61881

provided by the Big Five in proportion to their annual contributions to the United Nations, and

(VI) member states should take the measures prescribed in the Charter against any states which "as from today" might counit aggression against any of the peoples of Palestine.

3. Granades said that he would support the transfer of Jaffa to the Arab State. He contested the use made of population figures by Zafarulla Khan and argued that the provisions of the majority plan for Jewish immigration in the transition period and for the acquisition of citizenship in the Jewish state by Jews living in Jerusalem would ensure a substantial Jewish majority.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 88.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem].

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference:- C 371 61881

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Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

E 9482

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir A. Kirkbride No. 302

D. 2.20 p.m. 11th October, 1947.

11th October, 1947.

R. 7.05 p.m. 11th October, 1947.

Repeated to: United Kingdom Delegation,

New York Bagdad Cairo Jedda

British Middle East Office, Cairo Damascus

Beirut

Jerusalem - Saving

DAMED LATE SECRET

(Beirut please pass to Damascus as my telegram No. 77.)

Arab League meeting. 7256 60 t

Beirut telegram No. 104 to Amman.

Following is King Abdullah's version of his meeting with Azzem, Saleh Jabr and Samir on October 10th.

- 2. Visitors showed the King a copy of the decisions of the Council and asked him whether, in view of the critical period facing Arabs, he would invite members of the Council to visit him at Amman and so give the lie to rumours of internal disagreement in the League. The King replied that he would be delighted to receive members of the Council to lunch on Monday, adding that it was no fault of his that the Lebanese and Syrian Ministers had avoided Transjorden in the past.
- 3. Talking to Saleh Jabr and Samir the King observed that he was sure that the Lebanese, Syrians and Saudis were keeping their respective British Ministers fully informed of all developments and it was important that the Hashimite States should also do this, otherwise others might steal a march when it came to disposing of Arab areas of Palestine. Commenting to me the King said that as I was always kept fully informed I would realise that the observation was aimed at Saleh Jabr who he suspected of failing to co-operate as fully as he should with Embassy at Bagdad.
- 4. Talking to all three the King maintained that it was folly to talk of ejecting Jews from Palestine. He doubted firstly whether the Arabs were capable of doing so and was sure, secondly, that the civilised world would not permit them to do so if they were. He [gp. undec. ? said] that others agreed that the wise thing to do was to quickly come to terms with the Jews after a British withdrawel and to restrict them to as small a part of Palestine as was possible. The King pointed cut that he was prebably in a better position than any other Arab legger to make a settlement with the Jews but he thought no negetiations should take place until Jews were quite convinced that they cauld so longer depend on British protection.

A.A.A

5.

5. The King told me he found Assam much more reasonable in general and less obsessed with Egypt's difficulties. All three visitors were under the impression that the Lebanese authorities were genuinely upset by arrival of Haj Amin el Husseini

6. Until Semir returns I have no means of checking the accuracy of this statement.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation, New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda and British Middle East Office, as my telegrams Nos. 4, 53, 89, 52 and 41 respectively.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation, New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda and British Middle East Office.]

MM

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

9484

32003 F.O.P.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

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Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO AMMAN

Mr. Evans
No. 104
10th October. 1947

D. 9.40 a.m. 10th October, 1947 R.11.32 a.m. 10th October, 1947

Repeated to FOREIGN OFFICE NO. 725

B.M.E.O. Cairo

Azzam Pasha Saleh Jabr and Samir Pasha left by air at 9 a.m. this morning for Amman where they have been invited to lunch with King Abdullah. Purpose of visit is to persuade King Abdullah to extend an invitation to Arab League delegations (including Saudi Arabia) to visit Amman on October 13th.

2. Delegations (including Samir Pasha) are proceeding to Damascus tomorrow where they will be guests of President Kuwalka,

Sheik Yussef Yassin told me that he has telegraphed King Iba Saud to seek his permission to accept invitation to amush if it is made. He added that if he was not authorised by his King to go the Syrians and Lebanese would not go either.

Caire please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No. 173

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CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE 3 117

Mr. Evans
No. 727
October 10th, 1947.

D. 3.07 p.m. October 10th, 1947. R. 7.39 p.m. October 10th, 1947.

Repeated to Cairo, British Middle East Office (Embassy please pass as my telegram No. 174), Bagdad, Jedda, Amman, Jerusalem, United Kingdom Delegation New York.

Foreign Office please pass as my telegram No. 26.

Following communique was issued late on October 9th following meeting of the Arab League Council.

[Begins]

The Council of the Arab League held their third meeting at Aley on October 9th, 1947 at 1500 hours under the Presidency of the Prime Minister Riad Solh. After the messages addressed to the General Secretariat had been read, the President of the Council read the summary of the decisions taken by the sub-committee composed of the heads of the delegations of the Arab States dealing with the precautions which should be taken for the defence of Palestine in the light of latest developments, the general situation, and the possible developments arising out of the decisions of the British Government as Mandatory Power in respect of their policy towards Palestine. After discussing these decisions, the following resolutions were approved by the members of the Council of the League.

- decisions, which were to be executed in the event of the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry being accepted and a plan devised for their execution are still valid and should be executed if any solution affecting the rights of Palestine to be an independent Arab State is applied.
- 2. As regards the decision of the British Government recently announced to abandon the Mandate over Palestine and to withdraw their troops and administration, and in view of the presence of the Zionist forces and terrorist organisations which threaten the safety of the Arabs of Palestine, the Council consider that the Arab States should take military precautions on the Palestine frontiers. Therefore, the Council suggest that it should be recommended to the Governments of the Arab States that they should proceed to take these military precautions and at the same time that States limitrophe to Palestine should facilitate the participation and co-operation of non-limitrophe States.
- decisions to give effective help to the Arabs of Palestine, the Council recommend to the Governments of the States members of the League that they should begin giving material and

/moral

moral help to the Arabs of Palestine, in order to strengthen and encourage them in defending themselves and their existence, the Council also recommend to the States of the League that they should produce immediately the necessary funds for this purpose and that these funds should be spent under the supervision of a special committee.

[Ends]

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation, New York]

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Confidential Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO NO. 1907 JEDDA NO. 416 AMMAN NO. 451 DAMASCUS NO. 524 BEIRUT NO. 634 BAGDAD NO. 876

14th October 1947

D. 5. p.m. 15th October 1947

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York No. 3473 Washington No. 10555

CONFIDENTIAL

Beirut telegram No. 727 [of 10th October: Arab League and troop movements] to Foreign Office.

You will no doubt report immediately any information you may receive regarding movements or plans for movement of armed forces of Government to which you are accredited in connexion with Palestine situation.

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